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Structuring the Synthesis of Heap-Manipulating Programs
NADIA POLIKARPOVA, University of California, San Diego, USA
ILYA SERGEY, University College London, UK
This paper describes a deductive approach to synthesizing imperative programs with pointers from declarative
specifications expressed in Separation Logic. Our synthesis algorithm takes as input a pair of assertions—a pre-
and a postcondition—which describe two states of the symbolic heap, and derives a program that transforms
one state into the other, guided by the shape of the heap. The program synthesis algorithm rests on the novel
framework of Synthetic Separation Logic (SSL), which generalises the classical notion of heap entailment P ⊢ Q
to incorporate a possibility of transforming a heap satisfying an assertion P into a heap satisfying an assertion
Q. A synthesized program represents a proof term for a transforming entailment statement P { Q, and the
synthesis procedure corresponds to a proof search. The derived programs are, thus, correct by construction, in
the sense that they satisfy the ascribed pre/postconditions, and are accompanied by complete proof derivations,
which can be checked independently.
We have implemented a proof search engine for SSL in a form the program synthesizer called SuSLik. For
efficiency, the engine exploits properties of SSL rules, such as invertibility and commutativity of rule applications
on separate heaps, to prune the space of derivations it has to consider. We explain and showcase the use of SSL
on characteristic examples, describe the design of SuSLik, and report on our experience of using it to synthesize
a series of benchmark programs manipulating heap-based linked data structures.
1 INTRODUCTION
Consider the task of implementing a procedure swap(x, y), which swaps the values stored in two
distinct heap locations, x and y. The desired effect of swap can be concisely captured via pre/postcon-
ditions expressed in Separation Logic (SL)—a Hoare-style program logic for specifying and verifying
stateful programs with pointers (O’Hearn et al. 2001; Reynolds 2002):
{x 7→ a ∗ y 7→ b} void swap(loc x, loc y) {x 7→ b ∗ y 7→ a} (1)
This specification is declarative: it describes what the heap should look like before and after exe-
cuting swap without saying how to get from one to the other. Specifically, it states that the program
takes as input two pointers, x and y, and runs in a heap where x points to an unspecified value a,
and y points to b. Both a and b here are logical (ghost) variables, whose scope captures both pre- and
postcondition (Kleymann 1999). Because these variables are ghosts, we cannot use them directly to
update the values in x and y as prescribed by the postcondition; the program must first “material-
ize” them by readings them into local variables, a2 and b2 (cf. lines 2–3 of the code on the right).
1 void swap(loc x, loc y) {
2 let a2 = *x;
3 let b2 = *y;
4 *y = a2;
5 *x = b2;
6 }
In our minimalistic C-like language, loc denotes untyped
pointers, and let introduces a local dynamically-typed vari-
able. Unlike in C, both formals and locals are immutable (the
only mutation is allowed on the heap).
As a result of the two reads, the ghost variables in the post-
condition can now be substituted with equal program-level
variables: x 7→ b2 ∗ y 7→ a2. This updated postcondition can
be realized by the twowrites on lines 4–5, which conclude our implementation, so thewhole program
can now be verified against the specification (1).
Having done this exercise in program derivation, let us now observe that the SL specification has
been giving us guidance on what effectful commands (e.g., reads and writes) should be emitted next.
In other words, the synthesis of swap has been governed by the given specification in the same way
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the proof search is guided by a goal in ordinary logics. In this work, we make this connection explicit
and employ it for efficiently synthesizing imperative programs from SL pre- and postconditions.
Motivation. The goal of this work is to advance the state of the art in synthesizing provably correct
heap-manipulating programs from declarative functional specifications. Fully-automated program
synthesis has been an active area of research in the past years, but recent techniques mostly targeted
simple DSLs (Gulwani et al. 2011; Le and Gulwani 2014; Polozov and Gulwani 2015) or purely func-
tional languages (Feser et al. 2015; Kneuss et al. 2013; Osera and Zdancewic 2015; Polikarpova et al.
2016). The primary reason is that those computational models impose strong structural constraints
on the space of programs, either by means of restricted syntax or through a strong type system.
These structural constraints enable the synthesizer to discard many candidate terms a-priori, before
constructing the whole program, leading to efficient synthesis.
Low-level heap-manipulating programs in general-purpose languages like C or Rust lack inherent
structural constraints wrt. control- and data-flow, and as a result the research in synthesizing such
programs has been limited to cases when such constraints can be imposed by the programmer. From
the few existing approacheswe are aware of, Simpl (So and Oh 2017) and ImpSynth (Qiu and Solar-Lezama
2017) require the programmer to provide rather substantial sketches of the control-flow structure,
which help restrict the search space; Jennisys by Leino and Milicevic (2012) can only handle func-
tions that construct and read from data structures, but do not allow for destructive heap updates,
which are necessary for, e.g., deallocating, modifying, or copying a linked data structure.
Key Ideas. Our theoretical insight is that the structural constraints missing from an imperative lan-
guage itself, can be recovered from the program logic used to reason about programs in that language.
We observe that synthesis of heap-manipulating programs can be formulated as a proof search in a
generalized proof system that combines entailment with Hoare-style reasoning for unknown pro-
grams. In this generalized proof system, a statement P { Q means that there exists a program c ,
such that the Hoare triple {P} c {Q} holds; the witness program c serves as a proof term for the
statement. In order to be useful, the system must satisfy a number of practical restrictions. First, it
should be expressive enough to (automatically) verify the programs with non-trivial heap manipula-
tion. Second, it should be restrictive enough to make the synthesis problem tractable. Finally, it must
ensure the termination of the (possibly recursive) synthesized programs, to avoid vacuous proofs of
partial correctness.
In this paper we design such a generalized proof system based on the symbolic heap fragment of
malloc/free Separation Logic1 with inductive predicates, to which we will further refer as just Separa-
tion Logic or SL (O’Hearn et al. 2009; Reynolds 2002). Separation Logic has been immensely success-
ful at specifying and verifying many kinds of heap-manipulating programs, both interactively and
automatically (Appel et al. 2014; Berdine et al. 2011; Charguéraud 2010; Chen et al. 2015; Chin et al.
2012; Chlipala 2011; Distefano and Parkinson 2008; Nanevski et al. 2010; Piskac et al. 2014a), and is
employed in modern symbolic execution tools (Berdine et al. 2005; Rowe and Brotherston 2017). We
demonstrate how to harness all this power for program synthesis, devise the corresponding search
procedure and apply it to synthesize a number of non-trivial programs that manipulate linked data
structures. Finally, we show how to exploit laws of SL and properties of our proof system to prune
the search space and make the synthesis machinery efficient for realistic examples.
Contributions. The central theoretical contribution of the paper is Synthetic Separation Logic (SSL):
a system of deductive synthesis rules, which prescribe how to decompose specifications for complex
programs into specifications for simpler programs, while synthesizing the corresponding computa-
tions compositionally. In essence, SSL is a proof system for a new transformation judgment P{Q| c
1This nomenclature is due to Cao et al. (2017), who provide it as a rigorous alternative to the folklore notion of classical SL.
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(reads as “the assertion P transforms into Q via a program c”), which unifies SL entailment P ⊢ Q
and verification {P} c {Q}, with the former expressible as P{Q| skip.
The central practical contribution is the design and implementation of SuSLik—a deductive synthe-
sizer for heap-manipulating programs, based on SSL. SuSLik takes as its input a library of inductive
predicates, a (typically empty) list of auxiliary function specifications, and an SL specification of the
function to be synthesized. It returns a—possibly recursive, but loop-free—program (in a minimalistic
C-like language), which provably satisfies the given specification.
Our evaluation shows that SuSLik can synthesize all structurally-recursive benchmarks from pre-
vious work on heap-based synthesis (Qiu and Solar-Lezama 2017), without any sketches and in most
cases much faster. To the best of our knowledge, it is also the first synthesizer to automatically dis-
cover the implementations of copying linked lists and trees, and flattening a tree to a list.
The essence of SuSLik’s synthesis algorithm is a backtracking search in the space of SSL deriva-
tions. Even though the structural constraints (i.e., the shape of the heap) embodied in the synthesis
rules already prune the search space significantly (as shown by our swap example), a naïve backtrack-
ing search is still impractical, especially in the presence of inductive heap predicates. To eliminate
redundant backtracking, we develop several principled optimizations. In particular, we draw inspi-
ration from focusing proof search (Pfenning 2010) to identify invertible synthesis rules that do not
require backtracking, and exploit the frame rule of SL, observing that the order of rule applications
is irrelevant whenever their subderivations have disjoint footprints.
Paper outline. In the remainder of the paper we give an overview of the reasoning principles of
SSL, describe its rules and the meta-theory, outline the design and implementation of our synthesis
tool, present the optimizations and extensions of the basic search algorithm, and report on the eval-
uation of the approach on a set of case studies involving various linked structures, concluding with
a discussion of limitations and a comparison to the related work.
2 DEDUCTIVE SYNTHESIS FROM SEPARATION LOGIC SPECIFICATIONS
In Separation Logic, assertions capture the program state, represented by a symbolic heap. An SL as-
sertion (ranged over by symbols P and Q in the remainder of the paper) is customarily represented
as a pair {ϕ; P} of a pure part ϕ and a spatial part P . The pure part (ranged over by ϕ, ψ , ξ , and
χ ) is a quantifier-free boolean formula, which describes the constraints over symbolic values (rep-
resented by variables x , y, etc) The spatial part (denoted P , Q , and R) is represented by a collection
of primitive heap assertions describing disjoint symbolic heaps (heaplets), conjoined by the separat-
ing conjunction operation ∗, which is commutative and associative (Reynolds 2002). For example, in
the assertion {a , b; x 7→ a ∗ y 7→ b} the spatial part describes two disjoint memory cells that store
symbolic values a and b, while the pure part states that these values are distinct.
Our development is agnostic to the exact logic of pure formulae, as long as it is decidable and
supports standard Boolean connectives and equality.2 Our implementation uses the quantifier-free
logic of arrays, uninterpreted functions, and linear integer arithmetic, which is efficiently decidable
by SMT solvers, and sufficient to express all examples in this paper.
To begin with our demonstration, the only kinds of heaplets we are going to consider are the empty
heap assertion emp and points-to assertions of the form 〈x , ι〉 7→ e , where x is a symbolic variable or
pointer constant (e.g., 0), ι is a non-negative integer offset (necessary to represent records and arrays)
and e is a symbolic value, stored in a memory cell, addressed via a value of (x + ι).3 In most cases,
the offset is 0, so we will abbreviate heap assertions 〈x , 0〉 7→ e as x 7→ e .
2We require decidability for making the synthesis problem tractable, but it is not required for soundness of the logic.
3Further in the paper, we will extend the language of heap assertions to support memory blocks (arrays) with explicit memory
management, as well as user-defined inductive predicates.
Proc. ACM Program. Lang., Vol. 1, No. 1, Article . Publication date: November 2018.
:4 Nadia Polikarpova and Ilya Sergey
Emp
EV (Γ , P, Q) = ∅ ϕ ⇒ ψ
Γ ; {ϕ ; emp}{ {ψ ; emp} | skip
Read
a ∈ GV (Γ , P, Q) y < Vars (Γ , P, Q)
Γ ∪ {y } ; [y/a]{ϕ ; 〈x, ι 〉 7→ a ∗ P }{ [y/a]{Q} | c
Γ ; {ϕ ; 〈x, ι 〉 7→ a ∗ P }{ {Q} | let y = ∗(x + ι); c
Write
Vars (e ) ⊆ Γ
Γ ; {ϕ ; 〈x, ι 〉 7→ e ∗ P }{ {ψ ; 〈x, ι 〉 7→ e ∗Q } | c
Γ ; {ϕ ; 〈x, ι 〉 7→ e ′ ∗ P }{
{ψ ; 〈x, ι 〉 7→ e ∗Q }
 ∗(x + ι) = e ; c
Frame
EV (Γ , P, Q) ∩ Vars (R) = ∅
Γ ; {ϕ ; P }{ {ψ ;Q } | c
Γ ; {ϕ ; P ∗ R }{ {ψ ;Q ∗ R } | c
Fig. 1. Simplified basic rules of SSL.
Emp with c7 = skip
{x, y, a2, b2} ; {emp} { {emp}
c6 = c7
Frame
{x, y, a2, b2} ;
{
y 7→ a2
}
{
{
y 7→ a2
} c6
c5 = ∗y = a2; c6
Write
{x, y, a2, b2} ;
{
y 7→ b2
}
{
{
y 7→ a2
} c5
c4 = c5
Frame
{x, y, a2, b2} ;
{
x 7→ b2 ∗ y 7→ b2
}
{
{
x 7→ b2 ∗ y 7→ a2
} c4
c3 = ∗x = b2; c4
Write
{x, y, a2, b2} ;
{
x 7→ a2 ∗ y 7→ b2
}
{
{
x 7→ b2 ∗ y 7→ a2
} c3
c2 = let b2 = ∗y ; c3
Read
{x, y, a2} ;
{
x 7→ a2 ∗ y 7→ b
}
{ {x 7→ b ∗ y 7→ a2}
 c2
c1 = let a2 = ∗x ; c2
Read
{x, y } ;
{
x 7→ a ∗ y 7→ b
}
{ {x 7→ b ∗ y 7→ a }
 c1
Fig. 2. Derivation of swap(x,y) as c1.
Our programming component (to be presented formally in Sec. 3) is a simple imperative language,
supporting reading from pointer variables to (immutable) local variables (let x = *y), storing values
into pointers (*y = x), conditionals, recursive calls, and pure expressions. The language has no return
statement; instead, a function stores its result into an explicitly passed pointer.
2.1 Specifications for Synthesis
A synthesis goal is a triple Γ ;P { Q, where Γ is an environment, i.e., a set of immutable program
variables, P is a precondition (pre), and Q is a postcondition (post). Solving a synthesis goal means to
find a program c and a derivation of the SSL assertion Γ ; P{Q| c . To avoid clutter, we employ the
following naming conventions:
(a) the symbols P , ϕ, and P refer to the goal’s precondition, its pure, and spatial part;
(b) similarly, the symbols Q,ψ , and Q refer to the goal’s postcondition, its pure and spatial part;
(c) whenever the pure part of a SL assertion is true (⊤), it is omitted from the presentation.
In addition to those conventions, we will use the following macros to express the scope and the
quantification over variables of a goal Γ ; {P} { {Q}. First, by Vars (A) we will denote all variables
occurring in A, which might be an assertion, a logical formula, or a program. Ghosts (universally-
quantified logical variables), whose scope is both the pre and the post, are defined as GV (Γ ,P,Q) =
Vars (P) \ Γ . Goal existentials are defined as EV (Γ ,P,Q) = Vars (Q) \ (Γ ∪ Vars (P)). For instance,
taking Γ = {x}, P = {x , y; x 7→ y}, Q = {x 7→ z}, we have the ghosts GV (Γ ,P,Q) = {y}, the
existentials EV (Γ ,P,Q) = {z}, and the pure part of the post Q is implicitly true.
2.2 Basic Inference Rules
To get an intuition on how to represent program synthesis as a proof derivation in SSL, consider Fig. 1,
which shows four basic rules of the logic, targeted to synthesize programs with constant memory
footprint (remember that we use P and Q for the entire pre/post in a rule’s conclusion!).
The Emp rule is applicable when both pre and post’s spatial parts are empty. It requires that no
existentials remains in the goal, and the pure pre implies the pure post (per our assumptions on the
logic, the validity of this implication is decidable, so we can check it algorithmically). Emp has no
synthesis subgoals among the premises (making it a terminal rule), and no computational effect: its
witness program is simply skip.
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The Read rule turns a ghost variable a into a program variabley (fresh in the original goal). That is,
the newly assigned immutable program variable y is added to the environment of the sub-goal, and
all occurrences of a are substituted by y in both the pre and post. As a side-effect, the rule prepends
the read statement let y = ∗(x + ι) to the remainder of the program to be synthesized.
The rule Write allows for writing a symbolic expression e into a memory cell, provided all e’s
variables are program-level. It is customary for this rule to be followed by an application of Frame,
which is SSL’s version of Separation Logic’s frame rule. Here, we show a version of the rule, which
is a bit weaker than what’s in the full version of SSL, and will be generalized later. This rule enables
“framing out” a shared sub-heapR from the pre and post, as long as this does not create new existential
variables. Notice, that unlike the classical SL’s Frame rule by O’Hearn et al. (2001), our version does
not require a side condition saying thatRmust not contain program variables that aremodified by the
program [to be synthesized]: by removing R from the subgoal, we ensure that the residual program
will not be able to access any pointers from R, because it will be synthesized in a symbolic footprint
disjoint from R, and all local variables in SSL language are immutable.
Synthesizing swap. Armedwith the basic SSL inference rules from Fig. 1, let us revisit our initial ex-
ample: the swap function (1). Fig. 2 shows the derivation of the program using the rules, and should be
read bottom-up. For convenience, we name each subgoal’s witness program, starting from c1 (which
corresponds to swap’s body). Furthermore, each intermediate sub-goal highlights via gray boxes a
part of the pre and/or the post, which “triggers” the corresponding SSL rule. Intuitively, the goal of
the synthesis process is to “empty” the spatial parts of the pre and the post, so that the derivation
can eventually be closed via Emp; to this end, Read and Write work together to create matching
heaplets between the two assertions, which are then eliminated by Frame.
2.3 Spatial Unification and Backtracking
Now, consider the synthesis goal induced by the following SL specification:
{x 7→ 239 ∗ y 7→ 30} void pick(loc x, loc y) {x 7→ z ∗ y 7→ z} (2)
Since z does not appear among the formals or in the precondition, it is treated as an existential.
The postcondition thus allows x and y to point to any value, as long as it is the same value.
UnifyHeaps
[σ ]R′ = R
∅ , dom (σ ) ⊆ EV (Γ , P, Q)
Γ ; {P ∗ R }{ [σ ]
{
ψ ;Q ∗ R′
} c
Γ ; {ϕ ; P ∗ R }{
{
ψ ;Q ∗ R′
} c
Fig. 3. SSL rule for heap unification.
To deal with existentials in the heap, we introduce
the rule UnifyHeaps, which attempts to find a unifying
substitution σ for some sub-heaps of the pre and the
post. The domain of σ must only contain existentials.
For example, applying UnifyHeaps to the spec (2) with
R , x 7→ 239 and R′ , x 7→ z results in the sub-
stitution σ = [z 7→ 239], and the residual synthesis
goal {x ,y} {x 7→ 239 ∗ y 7→ 30} { {x 7→ 239 ∗ y 7→ 239},
which can be now synthesized by using the Frame,Write, and Emp rules.
Due to their freedom to choose a sub-heap (and a unifying substitution), Frame and UnifyHeaps
introduce non-determinism into the synthesis procedure and might require backtracking—a fact also
widely observed in interactive verification community (Gonthier et al. 2011; McCreight 2009) wrt. SL
assertions. For instance, consider the spec below:
{x 7→ a ∗ y 7→ b} void notSure(loc x, loc y) {x 7→ c ∗ c 7→ 0} (3)
void notSure(loc x, loc y) {
*x = y;
*y = 0;
}
One way to approach the spec (3) is to first read from
x , making a a program-level variable a2 (via Read), then
use UnifyHeaps and Frame on the x 7→ • heaplets in the
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SubstLeft
ϕ ⇒ x = y
Γ ; [y/x ]{ϕ ; P }{ [y/x ]{Q } | c
Γ ; {ϕ ; P }{ {Q } | c
StarPartial
x + ι , y + ι′ < ϕ ϕ ′ = ϕ ∧ (x + ι , y + ι′)
Γ ;
{
ϕ ′; 〈x, ι 〉 7→ e ∗
〈
y, ι′
〉
7→ e′ ∗ P
}
{ {Q }
 c
Γ ;
{
ϕ ; 〈x, ι 〉 7→ e ∗
〈
y, ι′
〉
7→ e′ ∗ P
}
{ {Q }
 c
Inconsistency
ϕ ⇒ ⊥
Γ ; {ϕ ; P }{ {Q } | error
SubstRight
x ∈ EV (Γ , P, Q)
Σ; Γ ; {P }{ [e/x ]{ψ , Q } | c
Σ; Γ ; {P }{ {ψ ∧ x = e ;Q } | c
Pick
y ∈ EV (Γ , P, Q)
Vars (e) ∈ Γ ∪ GV (Γ , P, Q)
Γ ; {ϕ ; P }{ [e/y]{ψ ;Q } | c
Γ ; {ϕ ; P }{ {ψ ;Q } | c
UnifyPure
[σ ]ψ ′ = ϕ ′
∅ , dom (σ ) ⊆ EV (Γ , P, Q)
Γ ; {P }{ [σ ]{Q } | c
Γ ;
{
ϕ ∧ ϕ ′; P
}
{
{
ψ ∧ψ ′;Q
} c
Fig. 4. Selected SSL rules for reasoning with pure constraints in the synthesis goal.
pre/post, substituting the existential c by a2. That, however, leaves us with an unsolvable goal
{x ,y, a2} {y 7→ b} { {a2 7→ 0}. Hence we have to backtrack, and instead unify c with y, eventu-
ally deriving the correct program notSure.
2.4 Reasoning with Pure Constraints
So far we have only looked at SL specifications whose pure parts were trivially true. Let us now turn
our attention to the goals that make use of non-trivial pure boolean assertions.
2.4.1 Preconditions. To leverage pure preconditions, we adopt a number of the traditional Small-
foot-style rules, whose SSL counterparts are shown in the top part of Fig. 4. In the nomenclature of
Berdine et al. (2005), all those rules are non-operational, i.e., correspond to constructing the proofs of
symbolic heap entailment and involve no programming component. Note that the original rules in
Berdine et al. (2005) assume a restricted pure logic with only equalities; we adapt these rules to our
logic-agnostic style, relying on the oracle for pure validity instead of original syntactic premises.
For instance, the rule SubstLeft makes use of a precondition that implies equality between two
universal variables, x = y, substituting all occurrences of x in the subgoal by y. The rule StarPar-
tial makes explicit the fundamental assumption of SL: disjointness of symbolic heaps connected
by the ∗ operator. Most commonly, this rule’s effect is observable in combination with another rule,
Inconsistency, which identifies an inconsistent pre, and emits an always-failing program error.
These three SSL rules can be observed in action via the following example:
{a = x ∧ y = a; x 7→ y ∗ y 7→ z} void urk(loc x, loc y) {true;y 7→ a ∗ x 7→ y} (4)
After applying SubstLeft, the goal transforms to {x ,y} {x 7→ x ∗ x 7→ z} { {x 7→ x ∗ x 7→ x},
which is clearly unsatisfiable, as the precondition requires two disjoint points-to heaplets with the
same source—a fact, which converted into a pure sub-formula x , x by StarPartial, resulting in
the error body via Inconsistency.
2.4.2 Postconditions. In the presence of non-trivial pure postconditions, we face the problem to
find suitable instantiations for their existentials. This is a challenging, yet well-studied problem, tack-
led by pure program synthesis (Alur et al. 2013). We consider this problem orthogonal to our agenda
of deriving pointer-manipulating programs, and represent pure synthesis with a simplification rule
SubstRight (Berdine et al. 2005), exploiting an equality in a goal’s postcondition, and an oracle rule
Pick, which picks an instantiation for an existential non-deterministically,
In practice, the non-determinism can be curbed, for example, by delegating to an existing pure
synthesizer (Kuncak et al. 2010; Reynolds et al. 2015). In our implementation, however, we found a
combination of first-order unification (rule UnifyPure) and restricted enumerative search (rule Pick
restricted to variables) to be very effective at discharging such synthesis goals.
Proc. ACM Program. Lang., Vol. 1, No. 1, Article . Publication date: November 2018.
Structuring the Synthesis of Heap-Manipulating Programs :7
As an example, consider the following goal (where S and S1 are finite sets and ·∪ is disjoint union):
{S = {v} ·∪ S1; x 7→ a} void elem(loc x, int v) {S = {v1} ·∪ S1; x 7→ v1 + 1} (5)
Following the rule UnifyPure, one can unify the two facts about sets in the pre and the post, ob-
taining the substitution [v1 7→ v]. The rest is accomplished by the ruleWrite, which emits the only
necessary statement for elem’s body: *x = v + 1.
2.5 Synthesis with Inductive Predicates
The real power of Separation Logic stems from its ability to compositionally reason about linked
heap-based data structures, such as lists and trees, whose shape is defined recursively via inductive
heap predicates. The most traditional example of a data structure defined this way is a linked list
segment lseg(x ,y, S) (Reynolds 2002), whose definition is given by the two-clause predicate below:
lseg(x ,y, S) , x = y ∧ {S = ∅; emp}
x , y ∧ {S = {v} ·∪ S1; [x , 2] ∗ x 7→ v ∗ 〈x , 1〉 7→ nxt ∗ lseg(nxt,y, S1)}
(6)
The predicate definition, which we will abstractly denote as D , p(xi )
〈
ξ j ,
{
χj ,Rj
}〉
j∈1...N
, starts
from the name p and a vector or formal parameters xi ; for lseg those are the symbolic pointer vari-
ables, x andy for the first and the last pointer in the list, as well as for the logical set S of its elements.
What follows is a sequence ofN inductive clauses, with a jth clause starting from a guard ξ j—a boolean
formula defining a condition on the predicate’s formals,4 followed by the clause body—a SL assertion
with a spatial part Rj and pure part χj , describing the shape of the heap and pure constraints, corre-
spondingly. Clauses’ free variables, i.e., non-formals, (e.g., v , nxt) are treated as ghosts or existentials,
depending on whether the predicate instance is in a pre or post of a goal. From now on, we extend
the definition of the goal, with a context Σ, which will store the definitions of inductive predicates
and specified functions, which are accessible in the derivation.
That is, the first clause of lseg states that in the case of x and y being equal, the linked list’s set of
element is empty and its implementation is an empty heap emp. The complementary second clause
postulates the existence of the allocated memory block (or just block) of two consecutive pointers
rooted at x (denoted [x , 2] ∗ x 7→ v ∗ 〈x , 1〉 7→ nxt), such that the first pointer stores the payload v ,
while the second one points to the tail of the list, whose shape is defined recursively via the same
predicate, although with different actuals, as captured by the predicate instance lseg(nxt,y, S1).
2.5.1 Dynamic Memory. In order to support dynamically allocated linked structures, as demon-
strated by definition (6), we extend the language of symbolic heaps with two new kinds of assertions:
blocks and predicate instances. Symbolic blocks are a well-established way to add to SL support for
consecutive memory chunks (Brotherston et al. 2017; Jacobs et al. 2011), which can be allocated and
disposed all together.5 Two SSL rules, Alloc and Free (presented in Sec. 3), make use of blocks, as
those appear in the post- and the pre-conditions of their corresponding goals. Conceptually, Alloc
looks for a block in the postcondition rooted at an existential and allocates a block of the same size
(by emitting the command let x = malloc(n)), adding it to the subgoal’s precondition. Free is trig-
gered by an un-matched block in the goal’s pre, rooted at some program variable x, which it then
disposes by emitting the call to free(x), removing it from the subgoal’s precondition.
4In the case of logical overlap, the conditions for different clauses are checked in the order the clauses are defined.
5An alternative would be to adopt an object model with fields, which is more verbose (Berdine et al. 2005).
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2.5.2 Induction. Let us now synthesize our first recursive heap-manipulating function, a linked
list’s destructor listfree(x), which expects a linked list starting from its argument x and ending with
the null-pointer, and leaves an empty heap as its result:
{lseg(x , 0, S)} void listfree(loc x) {emp} (7)
The first synthesis step is carried out by the SSL rule Induction. We postpone its formal descrip-
tion until the next section, conveying the basic intuition here. Induction only applies to the initial
synthesis goal whose precondition contains an inductive predicate instance, and its effect is to add a
new function symbol to the goal’s context, such that an invocation of this function would correspond
to a recursive call. In our example (7) Induction extends the context Σ with a “recursive hypothesis”
as follows (we explain the meaning of the tag 1 in lseg1(x ′, 0, S ′) later):6
Σ1 , Σ, listfree(x
′) :
{
lseg1(x ′, 0, S ′)
}
{emp} (8)
2.5.3 Unfolding Predicates. The top-level rule Induction is complemented by the rule Open (de-
fined in Sec. 3), which unfolds a predicate instance in the goal’s precondition according to its def-
inition, and creates a subgoal for each inductive clause. For instance, invoked immediately on our
goal (7), it has the following effect on the derivation:
(a) Two sub-goals, one for each of the clauses of lseg, are generated to solve:
(i) Σ1; {x} ; {x = 0 ∧ S = ∅; emp} { {emp}
(ii) Σ1; {x} ;
{
x , 0 ∧ S = {v} ·∪ S1; [x , 2] ∗ x 7→ v ∗ 〈x , 1〉 7→ nxt ∗ lseg
1(nxt,y, S1)
}
{ {emp}
(b) Assuming c1 and c2 are the programs solving the sub-goals (i) and (ii), the final program is ob-
tained by combining them as if (x = 0) {c1} else {c2}.
Thus, Open performs case-analysis according to the predicate definition. Note how the precondition
of each generated sub-goal is refined by the corresponding clause’s guard and body. The resulting
sub-programs, once synthesized, are then combined with the conditional statement (this is why we
require decidability of the guard statements), which branches on the predicate’s guard. It is easy to
see that the first sub-goal (i) can be immediately solved via Emp rule, producing the program skip.
2.5.4 Level Tags. Synthesizing recursive programs requires extra care in order to avoid infinite
derivations, as well as vacuously correct (in the sense of partial program correctness) non-terminating
programs that simply call themselves. To avoid this pitfall, we adopt the ideas from the Cyclic Ter-
mination Proofs in SL (Brotherston et al. 2012), under the assumption that employed user-defined
inductive predicates are well-founded, i.e., have their recursive applications only on strictly smaller
sub-heaps (Brotherston et al. 2008). We ensure that this is the case by checking that there is at least
one points-to predicate in clauses that also contain predicate instances.
Specifically, to avoid infinite unfolding of predicate instances we introduce level tags (natural num-
bers, ranged over by ℓ), which now annotate some predicate instances in the pre and post of the goal
and the context functions. For an instance in a goal’s pre, a tag determines whether a set of functions
in Σ that can be “applied” to it. As a result of a function application, tags are modified (as we explain
later), thus preventing functions from being “re-applied” to their own symbolic post-heaps. Since
tags only serve to control function calls, the rules Frame (Fig. 1) and UnifyHeaps (Fig. 3) ignore
them when comparing sub-heaps for equality. All predicates in the pre/post of the initial goal have
their level tag set as ℓ = 0, and the rule Open only applies to 0-tagged predicates, incrementing their
tag (i.e., one cannot “unfold again” an already opened instance).
6In SSL, a context Σ can also store user-provided specifications of auxiliary functions synthesized earlier. We will elaborate
on case studies relying on user-provided auxiliary functions in Sec. 6.2.
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Call
F , f (xi ) :
{
ϕf , Pf
}{
ψf , Qf
}
∈ Σ
R =ℓ [σ ]Pf ϕ ⇒ [σ ]ϕf
ϕ ′ , [σ ]ψf R
′ , ⌈[σ ]Qf ⌉ ei = [σ ]xi
Vars (ei ) ⊆ Γ Σ; Γ ;
{
ϕ ∧ ϕ ′; P ∗ R′
}
{ {Q }
 c
Σ; Γ ; {ϕ ; P ∗ R }{ {Q } | f (ei ); c
Close
D , p(xi )
〈
ξ j,
{
χj , Rj
}〉
j∈1. . .N
∈ Σ ℓ < MaxUnfold
1 ≤ k ≤ N σ , [xi 7→ yi ] R
′ , ⌈[σ ]Rk ⌉
ℓ+1
Σ; Γ ; {P }{
{
ψ ∧ [σ ]ξk ∧ [σ ]χk ;Q ∗ R
′
} c
Σ; Γ ; {P }{
{
ψ ;Q ∗ pℓ(yi )
} c
Fig. 5. Selected SSL rules for synthesis with recursive functions and inductive predicates.
To see how tags control what functions from Σ can be applied, consider the rule Call in Fig. 5. It
fires when the goal contains in its precondition a symbolic sub-heap R, which can be unified with the
precondition Pf of a function symbol f from the goal’s context Σ. This unification is similar to the
effect of UnifyHeaps, with the difference that Call takes level tags into the account (i.e., instances
with different tags cannot be unified), reflected in the tag-aware equality predicate =ℓ . Our example’s
second goal (ii)
{x} ;
{
x , 0 ∧ S = {v} ·∪ S1; [x , 2] ∗ x 7→ v ∗ 〈x , 1〉 7→ nxt ∗ lseg
1(nxt,y, S1)
}
{ {emp} (9)
can be now transformed, via Read (focused on 〈x , 1〉 7→ nxt), into
{x , nxt2} ;
{
x , 0 ∧ S = {v} ·∪ S1; [x , 2] ∗ x 7→ v ∗ 〈x , 1〉 7→ nxt2 ∗ lseg
1(nxt2,y, S1)
}
{ {emp}
(10)
void listfree(loc x) {
if (x = 0) {} else {
let nxt2 = *(x + 1);
listfree(nxt2);
free(x);
} }
Fig. 6. Synthesized listfree (7).
The grayed fragment in (10) can now be unified with the
precondition of listfree (8) following Call’s premise. As
the tags match (both indicate the first unfolding of the pred-
icate), unification succeeds with the substitution σ = [x ′ 7→
nxt2, S ′ 7→ S1] from f ’s parameters and ghosts to the goal
variables. The same rule produces, from the f ’postcondition,
a new symbolic heap R′, which replaces the targeted frag-
ment in the pre, recording the effect of the call. All tagged
predicate instances in R′ get their tags erased (⌈[σ ]Qf ⌉ ), thus, preventing any future recursive appli-
cations (via Call) on the produced symbolic heap (more on that design decision in Sec. 7). However,
in this example, the function’s post is merely {emp}, so the goal becomes:
{x , nxt2} ; {x , 0 ∧ S = {v} ·∪ S1; [x , 2] ∗ x 7→ v ∗ 〈x , 1〉 7→ nxt2 ∗ emp} { {emp} (11)
void listmorph(loc x, loc r) {
if (x = 0) { } else {
let v2 = *x;
let nxt2 = *(x + 1);
listmorph(nxt2, r);
let y12 = *r;
let y2 = malloc(3);
free(x);
*(y2 + 2) = y12;
*(y2 + 1) = v2 + 1;
*y2 = v2;
*r = y2;
} }
Fig. 7. Synthesized listmorph (13).
The remaining steps are carried out by the rule Free,
followed by Emp, with the former disposing the remain-
ing block, thus, completing the derivation with program
listfree shown in Fig. 6.
2.5.5 Unfolding in the postcondition. Whereas Open
unfolds predicate instances in a goal’s precondition, a
complementary rule Close (Fig. 5) performs a similar op-
eration on the goal’s postcondition. The main difference
is that instead of performing a case-split and emitting sev-
eral subgoals, Close non-deterministically picks a single
clause k from the predicate’s definition (the intuition be-
ing that the required case split has already been performed
by Open). Upon unfolding, the clause’s adapted guard ([σ ]ξk ) and pure part ([σ ]χk ) are added to the
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subgoal’s postcondition, while its spatial part also gets its level tags increased by one (⌈[σ ]Rk ⌉
ℓ+1),
in order to account for the depth of unfoldings.7
To showcase the use of Close, let us define a new predicate for a linked null-terminating structure
lseg2, which stores in each node the payload v and v + 1:
lseg2(x , S) , x = 0 ∧ {S = ∅; emp}
x , 0 ∧
{
S = {v} ·∪ S1;
[x , 3] ∗ x 7→ v ∗ 〈x , 1〉 7→ v + 1 ∗ 〈x , 2〉 7→ nxt ∗ lseg2(nxt, S1)
}
(12)
We now synthesize an implementation for the following specification, requiring tomorph a regular
list lseg(x , 0, S) to lseg2(y, S), both parameterized by the same set S :
{r 7→ 0 ∗ lseg(x , 0, S)} void listmorph(loc x, loc r) {r 7→ y ∗ lseg2(y, S)} (13)
The derivation starts Induction, then Opens lseg(x , 0, S), producing two sub-goals. The first one:
{x , r } ; {S = ∅ ∧ x = 0; r 7→ 0} {
{
r 7→ y ∗ lseg20(y, S)
}
(14)
is easy to solve via Close, which should pick the first clause from lseg2’s definition (12) (correspond-
ing to emp), followed by Frame to r 7→ y in the postcondition. The second subgoal, after having read
the value of (x + 1), thus into a program variable nxt2 looks as follows:
{x , r , nxt2} ;{
S = {v} ·∪ S1 ∧ x , 0; r 7→ 0 ∗ [x , 2] ∗ x 7→ v ∗ 〈x , 1〉 7→ nxt2 ∗ lseg
1(nxt2, 0, S1)
}
{{
r 7→ y ∗ lseg20(y, S)
} (15)
Now, Close comes to the rescue, by allowing us to unfold the grayed instance in (15)’s post:
{x , r , nxt2} ;{
S = {v} ·∪ S1 ∧ x , 0; r 7→ 0 ∗ [x , 2] ∗ x 7→ v ∗ 〈x , 1〉 7→ nxt2 ∗ lseg
1(nxt2, 0, S1)
}
{{
S = {v1} ·∪ S2; r 7→ y ∗ [y, 3] ∗ y 7→ v1 ∗ 〈y, 1〉 7→ v1 + 1 ∗ 〈y, 2〉 7→ nxt1 ∗ lseg2
1(nxt1, S2)
} (16)
In principle, nothing in the postcondition prevents us from applying Close again, unfolding the in-
stance lseg21(nxt1, S2) even further. Intuitively, a postcondition with a symbolic heap that elaborated
is less likely to be satisfied, hence we limit the number of “telescopic” unfoldings by enforcing the
boundary MaxUnfold for the level tag. We can now use the Call rule, unifying the precondition of
the induction hypothesis (13) with the grayed parts in the goal (16), obtaining the following subgoal
(notice the new instance lseg2(y1, S1) in the pre with its tag erased):
{x , r , nxt2} ;{
S = {v} ·∪ S1 ∧ x , 0; [x , 2] ∗ x 7→ v ∗ 〈x , 1〉 7→ nxt2 ∗ r 7→ y1 ∗ lseg2(y1, S1)
}
{{
S = {v1} ·∪ S2; r 7→ y ∗ [y, 3] ∗ y 7→ v1 ∗ 〈y, 1〉 7→ v1 + 1 ∗ 〈y, 2〉 7→ nxt1 ∗ lseg2
1(nxt1, S2)
}
The instances of lseg2 in the pre and the post, can now be unified via UnifyHeaps instantiating nxt1
with y1, followed by UnifyPure on pure parts, instantiating S2 with S1, and then framed via Frame.
The remaining derivation is done by Reading from r and x , subsequent disposing of a two-cell block
(grayed in the pre) and allocation of a three-cell block in order to match the grayed block in the post.
Finally, the exact payload for cells of the newly-allocated 3-pointer block is determined by unifying
the set assertions in the pure parts of the pre and post (via UnifyPure), and thenWrite records the
right values to satisfy the constraints imposed for the head of lseg2-like list by Definition (12). The
resulted synthesized implementation of listmorph is shown in Fig. 7.
7We will elaborate on the control of unfolding depth in Sec. 3.1.
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2.6 Enabling Procedure Calls by Means of Call Abduction
We conclude this overview with one last example—a recursive procedure for copying a linked list:
{r 7→ x ∗ lseg(x , 0, S)} void listcopy(loc r) {r 7→ y ∗ lseg(x , 0, S) ∗ lseg(y, 0, S)} (17)
To make things more fun, we pass the pointer to the head of the list via another pointer r, which
is also used to record the result of the function—an address y of a freshly allocated list copy. The
synthesis begins by using Induction, producing the function symbol
void listcopy(loc r') :
{
r ′ 7→ x ′ ∗ lseg1(x ′, 0, S ′)
}{
r ′ 7→ y′ ∗ lseg1(x ′, 0, S ′) ∗ lseg1(y′, 0, S ′)
}
(18)
It follows by Read (from r into x2) and Open, resulting in two subgoals, the first of which (an empty
list) is trivial. The synthesis proceeds, reading from x2 into v2 and from x2 + 1 into nxt2, so after
using Close (on lseg0(x , 0, S)) in the post, UnifyHeaps and Frame, we reach the following subgoal:
{x , r , x2, v2, nxt2} ;
{
S = {v2} ·∪ S1 ∧ x2 , 0; r 7→ x2 ∗ lseg
1(nxt2, 0, S1)
}
{{
r 7→ y ∗ lseg1(nxt2, 0, S2) ∗ lseg
0(y, 0, S)
} (19)
AbduceCall
F , f (xi ) :
{
ϕf ; Pf ∗ Ff
}{
ψf ;Qf
}
∈ Σ
Ff has no predicate instances
[σ ]Pf = P Ff , emp F
′ , [σ ]Ff
Σ; Γ ; {ϕ; F }{
{
ϕ; F ′
} c1
Σ; Γ ;
{
ϕ; P ∗ F ′ ∗ R
}
{ {Q}
 c2
Σ; Γ ; {ϕ; P ∗ F ∗ R}{ {Q}| c1; c2
Fig. 8. AbduceCall rule.
At this point of our derivation, we run into an issue.
Ideally, we would like to use the grayed fragment of the
goal (19)’s precondition, to fire the rule Call with the
spec (18), i.e. to make a recursive call on the tail list. How-
ever, the (18)’s precondition requires r to point to the start
of that list (nxt2), whereas in our case it still points to the
start of the original list (x2).
Any programmer would know a solution to this conun-
drum: we have to to write nxt2 into r , in order to provide
a suitable symbolic heap to make a recursive call. Emitting such a write command is a synthesis sub-
goal in itself. To generate such sub-goals, we introduce a novel rule, AbduceCall, which is shown in
Fig. 8 and attempts to prepare the symbolic pre-heap for the recursive call by adjusting constant-size
symbolic footprint to become unifiable with the recursive calls’ precondition.
1 void listcopy (loc r) {
2 let x2 = *r;
3 if (x2 = 0) { } else {
4 let v2 = *x2;
5 let nxt2 = *(x2 + 1);
6 *r = nxt2;
7 listcopy(r);
8 let y12 = *r;
9 let y2 = malloc(2);
10 *y2 = v2;
11 *(y2 + 1) = y12;
12 *r = y2;
13 } }
Fig. 9. Synthesized listcopy (17).
First, the rule inspects the preconditions of the goal and
of the cadidate callee F from Σ, it tries to split the former
into two symbolic sub-heaps, Pf and Ff , such that all pred-
icate instances are contained within Pf , while the rest of
the heaplets (i.e., blocks and points-to assertions) are in Ff .
Next, it tries to unify Pf from the function spec with some
sub-heap P from the goal’s precondition, finding a suit-
able substitution σ , such that P = [σ ]Pf . While doing so, it
does not account for the “remainder” [σ ]Ff , which might
not be immediately matched by anything in the goal’s pre-
condition. In order to make it match, the goal emits, as
one of its premises, a sub-goal Σ; Γ ; {ϕ; F }{ {true, F ′}| c1,
whose puspose is to synthesize a program c1, which will
serve as an impedance matcher between some symbolic
subheap F from the original goal’s pre and F ′ = [σ ]Ff .
8
For instance, in the specification (18), Pf = lseg
1(x ′, 0, S ′) and Ff = r
′ 7→ x ′, so an attempt to
unify the former with the predicate instance in the grayed fragment of the goal (19) results in the
substitution σ = [x ′ 7→ nxt2, S ′ 7→ S1]. Applying it to the remainder of the function spec’s pre, we
8Our implementation is smarter than that: it ensures that F and F ′ have the same shape and differ only in pointers’ values.
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Variable x,y Alpha-numeric identifiers
Value d Theory-specific atoms
Offset ι Non-negative integers
Expression e ::= d | x | e = e | e ∧ e | ¬e | . . .
Command c ::= let x = ∗(x + ι) | ∗(x + ι) = e |
skip | error | magic |
if (e) {c} else {c} | f (ei ) | c; c
Type t ::= loc | int | bool | set
Fun. dict. ∆ ::= ϵ | ∆, f (ti xi ) { c }
Fig. 10. Programming language grammar.
Pure assertion ϕ,ψ , ξ , χ ::= e
Symbolc heap P ,Q,R ::= emp | 〈e, ι〉 7→ e |
[x,n] | p(xi ) | P ∗Q
Assertion P,Q ::= {ϕ, P}
Heap predicate D ::= p (xi )
〈
ξj ,
{
χj ,Rj
}〉
Function spec F ::= f (xi ) : {P}{Q}
Environment Γ := ϵ | Γ ,x
Context Σ := ϵ | Σ,D | Σ, F
Fig. 11. SSL assertion syntax.
obtain F ′ = [σ ]Ff = r
′ 7→ nxt2. One of the candidates to the role of F from the goal’s precondition
is the heaplet r 7→ x2, so the corresponding subgoal will be of the form {r, . . .} ; {. . . ; r 7→ x2} {
{r ′ 7→ nxt2}, which will produce the write *r = nxt2. Fig. 9 shows the eventually synthesized imple-
mentation, with the abduced call-enabling write on line 6.
3 SYNTHETIC SEPARATION LOGIC IN A NUTSHELL
Having shown SSL in action, we now proceed with giving a complete set of its inference rules, along
with statements of the formal guarantees SSL provides wrt. synthesized imperative programs.
The syntax for the imperative language supported by SSL is given in Fig. 10. The set of values
includes at least integers and pointers (isomorphic to non-negative integers). Expressions include
variables, values, boolean equality checks and additional theory-specific expressions (e.g., integer or
boolean operations). The command magic does not appear in runnable code and is included in the
language for the purpose of a deductive synthesis optimization, which we will explain in Sec. 5.4.
The language of commands does not include loops, which are modelled via recursive procedure
calls (f (ei )). Notice that for simplicity we do not provide a mechanism to return a variable from
a procedure (so the language is missing the return command) and therefore all procedures’ return
type is void. However, the result-returning discipline for a procedure can be encoded via passing a
result-storing additional pointer, as, e.g., in Example (17). A function dictionary ∆ is simply a list of
function definitions of the form f (ti xi ) { c }.
The complete syntax of SSL assertions is shown in Fig. 11, and their meaning was explained in
detail throughout Sec. 2. We only notice here that, syntactically, pure assertions ϕ, ψ , etc coincide
with the language’s expressions e . The lack of the distinction between the two kinds is for the sake
of uniformity and to enable the use of third-party SMT solvers without committing to a specific first-
order logic as an inherent part of SSL. We use a simple type system to make sure that the expressions
serving as pure formulae are of type bool, while also making sure that set-theoretical operations,
such as ·∪, do not leak to the program level.
3.1 The Zoo of SSL Rules
Fig. 12 presents all rules of SSL. Since most of them have already made an appearance in Sec. 2, here,
we only elaborate on the new ones, and highlight some important aspects of their interaction. It is
convenient to split the set of rules into the following six categories:
C1 Top-level rules are represented by just one rule: Induction (Fig. 12, bottom right). This rule is
only applicable at the very first stage of the derivation, and it produced a specified symbol f ,
with the specification identical to the top-level goal (modulo renaming of variables to avoind
name capturing conflicts). In the case of several predicate instances p0(ei ) in the goal’pre, the
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Induction
f , goal’s name
xi , goal’s formals
Pf , p
1(yi ) ∗ ⌈P ⌉ Qf , ⌈Q ⌉
F , f (xi ) :
{
ϕf ; Pf
}{
ψf ;Qf
}
Σ, F; Γ ;
{
ϕ ;p0(yi ) ∗ P
}
{ {Q }
 c
Σ; Γ ;
{
ϕ ;p0(yi ) ∗ P
}
{ {Q }
 c
Emp
EV (Γ , P, Q) = ∅ ϕ ⇒ ψ
Γ ; {ϕ ; emp}{ {ψ ; emp} | skip
Inconsistency
ϕ ⇒ ⊥
Γ ; {ϕ ; P }{ {Q } | error
NullNotLVal
x , 0 < ϕ ϕ ′ , ϕ ∧ x , 0
Σ; Γ ;
{
ϕ ′; 〈x, ι 〉 7→ e ∗ P
}
{ {Q }
 c
Σ; Γ ; {ϕ ; 〈x, ι 〉 7→ e ∗ P }{ {Q } | c
SubstLeft
ϕ ⇒ x = y
Γ ; [y/x ]{ϕ ; P }{ [y/x ]{Q } | c
Γ ; {ϕ ; P }{ {Q } | c
StarPartial
x + ι , y + ι′ < ϕ ϕ ′ , ϕ ∧ (x + ι , y + ι′)
Σ; Γ ;
{
ϕ ′; 〈x, ι 〉 7→ e ∗
〈
y, ι′
〉
7→ e′ ∗ P
}
{ {Q }
 c
Σ; Γ ;
{
ϕ ; 〈x, ι 〉 7→ e ∗
〈
y, ι′
〉
7→ e′ ∗ P
}
{ {Q }
 c
Read
a ∈ GV (Γ , P, Q) y < Vars (Γ , P, Q)
Γ ∪ {y } ; [y/a]{ϕ ; 〈x, ι 〉 7→ a ∗ P }{ [y/a]{Q } | c
Σ; Γ ; {ϕ ; 〈x, ι 〉 7→ a ∗ P }{ {Q } | let y = ∗(x + ι); c
Open
D , p(xi )
〈
ξ j,
{
χj, Rj
}〉
j∈1. . .N
∈ Σ
ℓ < MaxUnfold σ , [xi 7→ yi ] Vars (yi ) ⊆ Γ
ϕ j , ϕ ∧ [σ ]ξ j ∧ [σ ]χj Pj , ⌈[σ ]Rj ⌉
ℓ+1 ∗ ⌈P ⌉
∀j ∈ 1. . .N , Σ; Γ ;
{
ϕ j ; Pj
}
{ {Q }
 c j
c , if ([σ ]ξ1) {c1 } else {if ([σ ]ξ2) . . . else {cN }}
Σ; Γ ;
{
ϕ ; P ∗ pℓ(yi )
}
{ {Q }
 c
Close
D , p(xi )
〈
ξ j,
{
χj , Rj
}〉
j∈1. . .N
∈ Σ
ℓ < MaxUnfold σ , [xi 7→ yi ]
for some k, 1 ≤ k ≤ N R′ , ⌈[σ ]Rk ⌉
ℓ+1
Σ; Γ ; {P }{
{
ψ ∧ [σ ]ξk ∧ [σ ]χk ;Q ∗ R
′
} c
Σ; Γ ; {P }{
{
ψ ;Q ∗ pℓ(yi )
} c
AbduceCall
F , f (xi ) :
{
ϕf ; Pf ∗ Ff
}{
ψf ;Qf
}
∈ Σ
Ff has no predicate instances [σ ]Pf = P
Ff , emp F
′ , [σ ]Ff Σ; Γ ; {ϕ ; F }{
{
ϕ ; F ′
} c1
Σ; Γ ;
{
ϕ ; P ∗ F ′ ∗ R
}
{ {Q }
 c2
Σ; Γ ; {ϕ ; P ∗ F ∗ R }{ {Q } | c1; c2
Call
F , f (xi ) :
{
ϕf ; Pf
}{
ψf ;Qf
}
∈ Σ
R =ℓ [σ ]Pf ϕ ⇒ [σ ]ϕf
ϕ ′ , [σ ]ψf R
′ , ⌈[σ ]Qf ⌉ ei = [σ ]xi
Vars (ei ) ⊆ Γ Σ; Γ ;
{
ϕ ∧ ϕ ′; P ∗ R′
}
{ {Q }
 c
Σ; Γ ; {ϕ ; P ∗ R }{ {Q } | f (ei ); c
Alloc
R = [z, n] ∗∗0≤i≤n (〈z, i 〉 7→ ei ) z ∈ EV (Γ , P, Q)(
{y } ∪
{
ti
})
∩ Vars (Γ , P, Q) = ∅
R′ , [y, n] ∗∗0≤i≤n (〈y, i 〉 7→ ti )
Σ; Γ ;
{
ϕ ; P ∗ R′
}
{ {ψ ;Q ∗ R }
 c
Σ; Γ ; {ϕ ; P }{ {ψ ;Q ∗ R } | let y = malloc(n); c
Free
R = [x, n] ∗∗0≤i≤n (〈x, i 〉 7→ ei )
Vars ({x } ∪ {ei }) ⊆ Γ Σ; Γ ; {ϕ ; P }{ {Q } | c
Σ; Γ ; {ϕ ; P ∗ R }{ {Q } | free(n); c
Write
Vars (e) ⊆ Γ Γ ; {ϕ ; 〈x, ι 〉 7→ e ∗ P }{ {ψ ; 〈x, ι 〉 7→ e ∗Q } | c
Γ ;
{
ϕ ; 〈x, ι 〉 7→ e′ ∗ P
}
{ {ψ ; 〈x, ι 〉 7→ e ∗Q }
 ∗(x + ι) = e ; c
UnifyHeaps
[σ ]R′ = R
frameable
(
R′
)
∅ , dom (σ ) ⊆ EV (Γ , P, Q)
Γ ; {P ∗ R }{ [σ ]
{
ψ ;Q ∗ R′
} c
Γ ; {ϕ ; P ∗ R }{
{
ψ ;Q ∗ R′
} c
Frame
EV (Γ , P, Q) ∩ Vars (R) = ∅
frameable
(
R′
)
Γ ; {ϕ ; P }{ {ψ ;Q } | c
Γ ; {ϕ ; P ∗ R }{ {ψ ;Q ∗ R } | c
Pick
y ∈ EV (Γ , P, Q)
Vars (e) ∈ Γ ∪ GV (Γ , P, Q)
Γ ; {ϕ ; P }{ [e/y]{ψ ;Q } | c
Γ ; {ϕ ; P }{ {ψ ;Q } | c
UnifyPure
[σ ]ψ ′ = ϕ ′
∅ , dom (σ ) ⊆ EV (Γ , P, Q)
Γ ; {P }{ [σ ]{Q } | c
Γ ;
{
ϕ ∧ ϕ ′; P
}
{
{
ψ ∧ψ ′;Q
} c
SubstRight
x ∈ EV (Γ , P, Q)
Σ; Γ ; {P }{ [e/x ]{ψ , Q } | c
Σ; Γ ; {P }{ {ψ ∧ x = e ;Q } | c
Fig. 12. All rules of SSL. Grayed parts are parameters; instantiating them differently yields different rules.
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rule non-deterministically picks one recursion scheme, whereas other predicate instances in f ’s
precondition get “sealed” via tag erasure ⌈P⌉ ).
C2 Terminals include Emp and Inconsistency. These rules conclude a successful derivation by emit-
ting skip or error, respectively.
C3 Normalization rules include NullNotLVal, SubstLeft, StarPartial, and Read. The role of
these rules is to normalize the precondition: eliminate ghosts and equal variables, and make
explicit the assumptions encoded in the spatial part. As we discuss in Sec. 5.1, a characteristic
feature of those rules is that they cannot cause their subderivation fail.
C4 Unfolding rules are the rules targeted specifically to predicate instances. The four basic unfolding
rules areOpen, Close,AbduceCall, andCall. As hinted before, the ruleOpen picks an instance
pℓ(ei ) in the goal’s pre, and produces a number of subgoals, emitting a conditional that accounts
for all of p’s clauses. Close acts symmetrically on the post. Both rules increment the tag for the
instances in the substituted clause bodies, and are not applicable for ℓ, which is equal or greater
than the set boundary on the depth of unfoldings, defined by the global synthesis parameter
MaxUnfold.9 In our practical experience MaxUnfold taken to be equal 1 suffices for most of
realistic case studies. The ruleAbduceCall prepares the heap for a call application (via Call), as
described in Sec. 2.6. Note that the rules UnifyHeaps and Frame have been slightly generalized
wrt. to what was shown in Fig. 1 and Fig. 3, and now include a parametric premise frameable .
If we define frameable to return true only for predicate instances, we obtain unfolding versions
of these rules, which deal specifically with predicate instances.
C5 Flat rules deal with with the flat part of the heap (which consists of block heaplets and heaplets
of the form x 7→ e). They include Alloc, Free,Write, as well as the flat versions of UnifyHeaps
and Frame, with frameable defined to return true for flat heaplets.
C6 Pure synthesis rules are responsible for instantiating existentials. In Fig. 12 this category is rep-
resented by three rules. The first one is nondeterministic Pick, which is difficult to implement
efficiently. In order to make the presentation complete, we include two remaining, somewhat
redundant but more algorithmic, pure synthesis rules introduced in Sec. 2.4.2 for the sake of
efficient search, namely UnifyPure and SubstRight.
Let us refer to rules that emit a sub-program as operational and to the rest (i.e., to the rules that
only change the assertions) as non-operational. The rules from Fig. 12 form the basis of SSL as a proof
system, allowing for possible extensions for the sake of optimization or handling pure constraints. We
make them intentionally declarative rather than algorithmic, which is essential for establishing the
logic’s soundness, leaving a lot of freedom for possible implementations. Such decisions have to be
made, for instance, when engineering an implementation of AbduceCall or Pick. The algorithmic
aspects of SSL, e.g., non-deterministic choice of a frame or a unifying substitution, are handled by
the procedures from Sec. 4.
3.2 Formal Guarantees for the Synthesized Programs
The definition of the operational semantics of the SSL language (Fig. 10) follows the standard RAM
model. Heaps (ranged over by h) are represented as partial finite maps from pointers to values, with
support for pointer arithmetic (via offsets). A function call is executed within its own stack frame
(c, s), where c is the next command to reduce and s is a store recording the values of the function’s
local variables and parameters. A stack S is a sequence of stack frames, and a configuration is a pair
of a heap and a stack. The small-step operational semantics relates a function dictionary ∆, and a
pair of configurations: ∆; 〈h, S〉  〈h′, S ′〉,10 with ∗ meaning its reflexive-transitive closure.
9Having the derivation/search depth bound byMaxUnfold affects the completeness but not soundness of SSL.
10We elide the transition rules for brevity; similar rules can by found, e.g., in the work by Rowe and Brotherston (2017).
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Let us denote the valuation of an expression e under a store s as JeKs . Let I range over interpreta-
tions—mappings from user-provided predicatesD to the relations on heaps and vectors of values. To
formally define the validity of Hoare-style specs in SSL, we use the standard definition of the satisfac-
tion relation Σ
I
as a relation between pairs of heaps and stores, contexts, interpretations, and SSL
assertions without ghosts. For instance, the following SSL definitions are traditional for Separation
Logics with interpreted predicates (Berdine et al. 2005; Nguyen et al. 2007):
• 〈h, s〉 Σ
I
{ϕ; emp} iff JϕKs = true and dom (h) = ∅.
• 〈h, s〉 Σ
I
{ϕ; [x ,n]} iff JϕKs = true and dom (h) = ∅.
• 〈h, s〉 Σ
I
{ϕ; 〈e1, ι〉 7→ e2} iff JϕKs = true and dom (h) = Je1Ks + ι and h(Je1Ks + ι) = Je2Ks .
• 〈h, s〉 Σ
I
{ϕ; P1 ∗ P2} iff ∃h1,h2,h = h1 ·∪ h2 and 〈h1, s〉 
Σ
I
{ϕ; P1} and 〈h2, s〉 
Σ
I
{ϕ; P2}.
• 〈h, s〉 Σ
I
{ϕ;p(xi )} iff JϕKs = true and D , p(xi )
〈
ξ j ,
{
χj ,Rj
}〉
∈ Σ and
〈
h, JxiKs
〉
∈ I(D).
Therefore, blocks have no spatial meaning, except for serving as an indicator on the memory frag-
ments that we allocated and can be disposed.
To equip ourselves for the forthcoming proof of SSL soundness, we provide a definition of (sized)
specification validity, which relies on the notion of a heap size |h | , |dom (h) |:
Definition 3.1 (Sized validity). We say a specification Σ; Γ ; {P} c {Q} is n-valid wrt. the function
dictionary ∆ whenever for any h,h′, s, s ′ such that
• |h | ≤ n,
• ∆; 〈h, (c, s) · ϵ〉  ∗ 〈h′, (skip, s ′) · ϵ〉, and
• dom (s) = Γ and ∃σgv = [xi 7→ di ]xi ∈GV(Γ ,P,Q) such that 〈h, s〉 
Σ
I
[σgv]P,
it is the case that ∃σev = [yj 7→ d j ]yj ∈EV(Γ ,P,Q), such that 〈h
′, s ′〉 Σ
I
[σev ·∪ σgv]Q
Definition 3.1 is rather peculiar in that it defines a standard Hoare-style soundness wrt. pre/post,
while doing that only for heaps of size smaller than n. This is an important requirement to stage a
well-founded inductive argument for our soundness proof of SSL-based synthesis in the presence of
recursive calls. By introducing the explicit sizes to the definition of validity, we can make sure that
we only deal with calls on strictly decreasing subheaps wrt. the heap size when invoking functions
(auxiliary ones or recursive self). To make full use of this idea, we add one more auxiliary definition,
stratifying the shape of function dictionaries wrt. their specifications.
Definition 3.2 (Coherence). A dictionary ∆ is n-coherent wrt. a context Σ (coh (∆, Σ,n)) iff
• ∆ = ϵ and functions(Σ) = ϵ , or
• ∆ = ∆′, f (ti xi ) { c }, and Σ = Σ
′, f (xi ) : {P}{Q}, and coh (∆
′, Σ ′,n), and Σ ′; {xi } ; {P} c {Q} is
n-valid wrt. ∆′, or
• ∆ = ∆′, f (ti xi ) { c }, and Σ = Σ
′, f (xi ) :
{
ϕ; ⌈P⌉ ∗ p1(ei )
}
{⌈Q⌉ }, and coh (∆′, Σ ′,n), and
Σ; {xi } ;
{
⌈P⌉ ∗ p1(ei )
}
c {⌈Q⌉ } is n′-valid wrt. ∆ for all n′ < n.
That is, coherence is defined inductively on the dictionary/context shape (regarding specified func-
tions and ignoring predicate definitions). A possibility of a (single) recursive definition f is taken into
the account in its last option. In that last clause, recursive calls to the function f from ∆ may only
take place on heaps of size strictly smaller than n, whereas there is no such restriction for the calls
to user-provided auxiliary functions, that can be invoked on heaps of sizes up to n.
Soundness of Synthetic Separation Logic is stated by Theorem 3.3, which defines validity of the
synthesized program for any size of the input heap n, assuming that the validity of all recursive calls
of the synthesized programs is only established for n′ < n, where the case n = 0means no calls take
place and forms the base of the inductive reasoning.
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Theorem 3.3 (Soundness of SSL). For any n, ∆′, if
(i) Σ ′; Γ ; {P}{ {Q}| c for a goal named f with formal parameters Γ , xi , and
(ii) Σ ′ is such that coh (∆′, Σ ′,n), and
(iii) for all p0(ei ),ϕ; P , such that {P} =
{
ϕ;p0(ei ) ∗ P
}
, taking F , f (xi ) :
{
ϕ;p1(ei ) ∗ ⌈P⌉
}
{⌈Q⌉ },
Σ ′,F ; Γ ; {P} c {Q} is n′-valid for all n′ < n wrt. ∆ , ∆′, f (ti xi ) { c },
then Σ ′; Γ ; {P} c {Q} is n-valid wrt. ∆.
Proof. By the top-level induction on n and by inner induction on the structure of derivation
Σ ′; Γ ; {P}{ {Q}| c . We refer the reader to Appendix A for the details. 
Theorem 3.3 states that a program derived via SSL constitutes a valid spec with its goal (i.e., all
writes, reads and deallocations in it are safe wrt. accessing heap pointers), assuming that recursive
calls, if present, are made on reduced sub-heaps. The technique we used—allowing for safe calls done
only on smaller sub-heaps—is reminiscent to the one employed in size-change termination-based
analyses (Lee et al. 2001), which ensure that every infinite sequence of calls would cause infinite
descent of some values, leading to the following result.
Theorem 3.4 (Termination of SSL-synthesized programs). A program, which is derived via SSL
rules from a spec that uses only well-founded predicates, terminates.
Proof. The only source of non-termination is calls. Auxiliary function calls cannot be chained
infinitely as they erase tags on their post-heaps. Every recursive self-call is applicable after opening
a well-founded instance, and hence is done on a smaller sub-heap, erasing tags on its post-heap. 
4 BASIC SSL-POWERED SYNTHESIS ALGORITHM
In this section we show how to turn SSL from a declaratively defined system (Fig. 12) into a search
algorithm with backtracking for deriving provably correct imperative programs.
G ∈ Goal ::= 〈f , Σ, Γ , {P}, {Q}〉
K ∈ Cont , (Command)n → Command
S ∈ Deriv ::=
〈
Gi ,K
〉
R ∈ Rule , Goal ⇀ ℘(Deriv)
Encoding Rules and Derivations. The display on the
right shows an algorithmic representation of SSL deriva-
tions and rules. To account for the top-level goal
(which mandates the program synthesizer to generate
a runnable function), we include the function name f
into the goal G, whose other components are the context Σ, environment Γ (initialized with f ’s for-
mals), pre {P} and post {Q}. A successful application or a rule R results in one or more alternative
sub-derivations Sk . Several alternatives arise when the rule exhibits non-determinism (e.g., due to
choosing a sub-heap to a unifying substitution), and are explored by a search engine one by one,
until it finds one that succeeds. This is customary for a conversion of a declarative inference system
to an algorithmic one (Pierce 2002, Chapter 16).
In its turn, each sub-derivation is a pair. Its first component contains zero (if R is a terminal)
or more sub-goals, which all need to be solved (think of a conjunction of a rule’s premises). The
second component of the sub-derivation is a continuation K , which combines the list of commands,
produced as a result of solving subgoals, into a final program. The arity of a continuation (length
of a list it accepts) is the same as a number of sub-goals the corresponding rule emits (typically
one or more). Zero-arity means that the continuation has been produced by a terminal, and simply
emits a constant program. For non-operational rules (e.g., Frame), K , λ[c].c . For operational rules
K typically prepends a command to the result (e.g., Write), or generates a conditional statement
(Open). Therefore, the synthesizer procedure constructs the program by applying the continuations
of rules that have succeeded earlier, to the resulting programs by their subgoals, on the “backwards”
walk of the recursive search, in the style of logic programming (Mellish and Hardy 1984).
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Algorithm 4.1: synthesize (G : Goal, rules : Rule∗)
Input: Goal G = 〈f , Σ, Γ , {P }, {Q }〉
Input: List rules of available rules to try
Result: Program c , such that
Σ; f (Γ ) {c } ; Γ {P }c {Q }
1 function synthesize (G, rules) =
2 withRules(rules, G)
3 function withRules (rs, G) =
4 match rs
5 case [ ] ⇒ Fail
6 case R :: rs′ ⇒
7 subderivs = filterComm
(
R(G)
)
8 if isEmpty(subderivs) then
9 withRules(rs′)
10 else
11 tryAlts(subderivs, R, rs′, G)
12 function tryAlts (derivs, R, rs, G) =
13 match derivs
14 case [ ] ⇒ if isInvert(R) then Fail else withRules(rs, G)
15 case 〈goals, K〉 :: derivs′ ⇒
16 match solveSubgoals(goals, K)
17 case Fail ⇒ tryAlts(derivs′, R, rs, G)
18 case c ⇒ if c = magic then tryAlts(derivs′, R, rs, G) else c
19 function solveSubgoals (goals, K) =
20 cs := [ ]
21 pickRules = λG . phasesEnabled ? nextRules(G) : AllRules
22 for G ← goals; c = synthesize(G, pickRules(G)); c , Fail do
23 cs := cs ++ [c]
24 if |cs | < |goals | then Fail else K(cs)
The algorithm. The pseudocode of our synthesis procedure is depicted by Algorithm 4.1. Let us
ignore the grayed fragments in the pseudocode for now and agree to interpret the code as if they
were not present. Those fragments corresponds to optimizations, whichwe describe in detail in Sec. 5.
The algorithm is represented by four mutually-recursive functions:
• synthesize (G, rules) is invoked initially on a top-level goal, with rules instantiated with AllRules–
all rules from Fig. 12. It immediately passes control to the first auxiliary function, withRules.
• withRules (rs,G) iterates through the list rs of remaining rules, applying each one to the goal
G. Once an application of some rule R succeeds (i.e., it emits a non-empty set of alternative sub-
derivations subderivs), those are passed for solving to tryAlts. The case when a rule application
emits no sub-derivations, is considered a search failure, so the next rule is tried from the list, until
no more rules remains (line 5), at which point the search fails.
• tryAlts (derivs,R, rs,G) recursively processes the list of alternative sub-derivations derivs, gener-
ated by the rule R. If the list is exhaused (line 14), withRules is invoked to try the rest of the rules
rs. Otherwise, solveSubgoals is invoked for an alternative to solve all its sub-goals goals and apply
the continuation K . In the case of success (line 18), the resulting program c is returned.
• solveSubgoals (goals,K) tries to solve all subgoals given to it, by invoking synthesize recursively
with a suitable (full) list of rules, essentially, restarting the search problem “one level deeper” into
the derivation. Unless some of the goals failed, their results are combined via K .11
The algorithm implements is a naïve backtracking search that explores the space of all valid SSL
derivations rooted at the initial synthesis goal. The search proceeds in a depth-first manner: it starts
from the root (the initial goal) and always extends the current incomplete derivation by applying a
rule to its leftmost open leaf (i.e., a leaf that is not a terminal application). The algorithm terminates
when the derivation is complete, i.e., it has no open leaves.
In our experience, the algorithm implementation terminated on all inputs we provided. It seems
probable that this can be established by considering the following tuples, ordered lexicographically,
as a termination measure for a given goal G: 〈 # 0- or 1-tagged predicate instances; # heaplets in
pre and post, for which there is no matching one in the post/pre; # existentials; # ”flat” heaplets;
# conjuncts in the pre; # of points-to heaplets, whose disjointness or non-null-ness is not captured
11The actual implementation is more efficient than that and uses a breakable loop.
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in the pre 〉. Notice that each rule from Fig. 12, except for Open and Close reduces this value for the
emitted sub-goals. Applicability of those two rules is handled via MaxUnfold parameter.
That said, we have not proven termination of synthesize and leave it a conjecture.
5 OPTIMIZATIONS AND EXTENSIONS
The basic synthesis algorithm presented in Sec. 4 is a naïve backtracking in the space of all valid SSL
derivations. Note that this is already an improvement over a blind search in the space of all programs:
some incorrect programs are excluded from consideration a-priori, such as, e.g., programs that read
from unallocated heap locations. In this section we show how to further prune the search space by
identifying unsolvable goals and avoiding their exploration.
5.1 Invertible Rules
Our first optimization relies on a well-known fact from proof theory (Liang and Miller 2009) that
certain proof rules are invertible: applying such a rule to any derivable goal produces a goal that is
still derivable. In other words, applying invertible rules eagerly without backtracking does not affect
completeness. Algorithm 4.1 leverages this fact in line 14: when all sub-derivations of an invertible
rule R fail, the algorithm need not backtrack and try other rules, since the failure cannot be due to
R and must have been caused by a choice made earlier in the search.
In SSL, the normalization rules—Read, StarPartial, NullNotLVal, and SubstLeft—are invert-
ible. The effect of these rules on the goal is either to change a ghost into a program-level variable or
to strengthen the precondition; no rule that is applicable to the original goal can become inapplicable
as a result of this modification, which is confirmed by inspection of all rules in Fig. 12.
5.2 Multi-Phased Search
Among the rules of SSL described in Sec. 3, the unfolding rules are focused on transforming (and
eventually eliminating) instances of inductive predicates, while flat rules are focused on other types
of heaplets (i.e., points-to and blocks). We observe that if the unfolding rules failed to eliminate a
predicate instance from the goal, there is no point to apply flat rules to that goal. It is easy to show
that the flat rules can neither eliminate predicates from the goal, nor enable previously disabled
unfolding rules: the only unfolding rule that matches on flat heaplets is Call, but those heaplets
need not be “prepared” by the flat rules, since that’s what AbduceCall is for.
Following this observation, without loss of completeness, we can split the synthesis process into
two phases: the unfolding phase, where flat rules are disabled, and the flat phase, which only starts
when the goal contains no more predicate instances, and hence unfolding rules are inapplicable. This
optimization is implemented in line 21 of Algorithm 4.1. As a result, some unsolvable goals will be
identified early, in the unfolding phase. For example, the following goal:
{y,a,b} ; {y 7→ b ∗ a 7→ 0;} {
{
y 7→ u ∗ u 7→ 0 ∗ lseg1(u, 0, S)
}
will fail immediately without exploring fruitless transformations on its flat heap, since no unfolding
rules are applicable (assuming MaxUnfold = 1).
5.3 Symmetry reduction
Backtracking search often explores all reorderings of a sequence of rule applications, even if they
commute, i.e., the order of applications does not change the end sub-goal. As an examples, consider
the following goal:
{x ,y,a,b} ; {x 7→ a ∗ y 7→ b ∗ a 7→ 0} { {x 7→ a ∗ y 7→ b ∗ b 7→ 0}
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PostInconsistent
ϕ ∧ψ ⇒ ⊥
Σ; Γ ; {ϕ ; P }{ {ψ , Q } | magic
PostInvalid
P has no pred. instances
EV (Γ , P, Q) = ∅ ¬ (ϕ ⇒ ψ )
Σ ; Γ ; {ϕ ; P }{ {ψ , Q } | magic
UnreachHeap
P,Q have no pred. instances or blocks
unmachedHeaplets(P, Q )
Σ ; Γ ; {ϕ, P }{ {ψ , Q } | magic
Fig. 13. Failure rules.
Framing out x 7→ a and then y 7→ b, reveals the unsolvable goal {a 7→ 0} { {b 7→ 0}; upon back-
tracking, the naïve search would try the two applications of Frame in the opposite order, leading to
the same result.
We implemented a symmetry reduction optimization to eliminate redundant backtracking of this
kind. To this end, we keep track of the footprint of each rule application, i.e., the sub-heaps of its
goal’s pre and post that the application modifies. This enables us to identify whether two sequential
rule applications commute. Next, we impose a total order on rule applications; line 7 of Algorithm 4.1
rejects a new rule applicationR if it commuteswith an earlier applicationR ′ in the current derivation,
but comes before R ′ in the total order.
5.4 Early Failure Rules
Sometimes on can identify an unsolvable goal by analyzing its pre and post. For example, the goal
{x ,y} ; {a = 0; x 7→ a;} { {a = u ∧ u , 0; x 7→ u}
is unsolvable because its pure postcondition is logically inconsistent with the precondition. To lever-
age this observation and eliminate redundant backtracking, we extend SSL with failure rules, which
fire when they identify such unsolvable goals. Each failure rule is a terminal one, so it prevents further
exploration of the (unsolvable) goal. Unlike other terminals, which conclude a successful derivation
with skip or error, a failure rule emits a special spurious program magic. Algorithm 4.1 intercepts any
appearance of magic in line 18, and treats the derivation as a unsuccessful. All failure rules are also
invertible, hence the effect is to backtrack an application of an earlier rule.
Our set of failure rules is shown in Fig. 13. The rule PostInconsistent identifies a goal where
the the pure postcondition is inconsistent with the precondition. This is safe because during the
derivation both assertions can only become stronger (as a result of unfolding rules); also, even if the
postcondition still contains existentials, no instantiation of those existentials can produce a formula
that is consistent with (let alone implied by) the precondition. The rule PostInvalid fires on a goal
where the pure postcondition (which is free of existentials) is not implied by the precondition; this
rule only applies when the precondition is free of predicate applications, and hence its pure part can-
not be strengthened any further. The rule UnreachHeap fires when the spatial pre and post contian
only points-to heaplets, but the left-hand sides of these heaplets cannot be unified; in this case neither
UnifyHeaps norWrite can make the heaplets match. Note that it is important for completeness that
failure rules are checked after Inconsistency: if the pure precondition is inconsistent, the derivation
should not fail, but should instead emit error.
5.5 Extensions
We wrap up this section with a description of two SSL extensions used by our implementation in
order to expand the class of programs it can synthesize.
5.5.1 Auxiliary Functions and Call Rule. The presented in Fig. 12 version of Call, which erases
the tags from the callee’s post, hurts the framework’s completeness. While it is not unsafe to employ
the predicates from the procedure call’s postcondition in further procedure calls, one cannot ensure
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that they denote “smaller heaplets” and thus that the program terminates.12 To circumvent this limita-
tion for particularly common scenarios, we had to introduce one divergence between SuSLik and SSL
as shown in Fig. 12. Specifically, in the tool, we implemented support for stratified chained auxiliary
function calls, i.e., calls on a heap resulted from another, preceding, call (e.g., in flatten w/append
and insertion sort). To allow for them, we had to implement slightly different versions of Induc-
tion/Call rules, with an additional alternative in their premises, which instead of erasing tags of
the corresponding part of the post (⌈Qf ⌉ ) would increment them: ⌈Qf ⌉
•+1. This would prevent a call
of the same function on the resulting heap fragment, but would enable calls of auxiliary functions,
whose specs’ pre feature predicates with matching higher-level tags. Eventually, due to incrementa-
tion, no applicable functions would have left in the context Σ. While this extension is unlikely to
break the SSL soundness and termination results (due to the limit of chained applications, enabled
by growing tags), it would require us to generalize the well-foundedness argument in Sec. 3.2, and
in the interest of time we did not carry out this exercise.
Branch
Σ; Γ ; {ϕ ∧ψ ; P}{ {Q}| c1
Σ; Γ ; {ϕ ∧ ¬ψ ; P}{ {Q}| c2
Σ; Γ ; {ϕ; P}{ {Q}| if (ψ ) c1 else c2
Fig. 14. Branch rule.
5.5.2 Branch Abduction. As described, SSL rules only
emit conditional statements when unfolding an inductive
predicate instance in the goal’s precondition via Open.
This prevents our framework from synthesizing some use-
ful functions, in particular, those that branch on the con-
tent on a data structure rather than its shape. This source
of incompleteness can easily be mitigated by adding a rule Branch (Fig. 14), which is always appli-
cable and generates a conditional statement with a non-deterministically chosen guard. Of course,
in practice picking the guard blindly is not feasible. Our implementation employs a variation of a
popular technique in program synthesis, known as condition (or branch) abduction (Alur et al. 2017;
Kneuss et al. 2013; Leino and Milicevic 2012; Polikarpova et al. 2016). Instead of emitting conditionals
eagerly, branch abduction tries to detect when the current program under consideration is a promis-
ing candidate for becoming a branch of a conditional, and then abduces a guard that would make this
branch satisfy the specification.
The SSL variation of branch abduction piggy-backs on the failure rule PostInvalid (Sec. 5.4),
which detect a goal whose pure postcondition ψ has no existentials and does not follow from the
precondition ϕ. Instead of rejecting this goal as unsolvable, branch abduction searches a small set of
pure formulas (all atomic formulas over program variables in Γ ); if it can find a formula ϕ ′ such that
ϕ ∧ ϕ ′ ⇒ ψ , it abduces ϕ ′ as the branch guard for the current goal.
For a simple example, consider the following synthesis goal that corresponds to computing a lower
bound of two integers x and y:
{x ,y} ; {r 7→ 0} { {m ≤ x ∧m ≤ y; r 7→m}
We first apply Pick with [m 7→ x], arriving at the goal {r 7→ 0} { {x ≤ x ∧ x ≤ y; r 7→ x}. At
this point, the postcondition is invalid, so branch abduction fires and infers a guard x ≤ y for the
current derivation. It also emits a new goal for synthesizing the else branch, where the negation of
the abduced condition is added to the precondition: {¬(x ≤ y); r 7→ 0} { {m ≤ x ∧m ≤ y; r 7→m}.
If the synthesis of the else branch succeeds, the two branches are joined by a conditional; otherwise
branch abduction fails.
12A similar issue is reported in the work by Rowe and Brotherston (2017) on verifying termination of procedural programs.
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Table 1. Benchmarks and SuSLik results. For each benchmark, we report the size of the synthesized Code (in
AST nodes) and the ratio Code/Spec of code to specification; as well as synthesis times (in seconds): with all
optimizations enabled (Time), without phase distinction (T-phase), without invertible rules (T-inv), without early
failure rules (T-fail), without the commutativity optimization (T-com), and without any optimizations (T-all). T-
IS reports the ratio of synthesis time in ImpSynt to Time. “-” denotes timeout of 120 seconds.
Group Description Code Code/Spec Time T-phase T-inv T-fail T-com T-all T-IS
Integers
swap two 12 0.9x < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1
min of two2 10 0.7x 0.1 0.1 0.1 < 0.1 0.1 0.2
Linked
List
length1,2 21 1.2x 0.4 0.9 0.5 0.4 0.6 1.4 29x
max1 27 1.7x 0.6 0.8 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.8 20x
min1 27 1.7x 0.5 0.9 0.5 0.4 0.5 1.2 49x
singleton2 11 0.8x < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1
dispose 11 2.8x < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1
initialize 13 1.4x < 0.1 0.1 0.1 < 0.1 0.1 < 0.1
copy3 35 2.5x 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.2 -
append3 19 1.1x 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.7
delete3 44 2.6x 0.7 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.7
Sorted
list
prepend1 11 0.3x 0.2 1.4 83.5 0.1 0.1 - 48x
insert1 58 1.2x 4.8 - - - 5.0 - 6x
insertion sort1 28 1.3x 1.1 1.8 1.3 1.2 1.2 74.2 82x
Tree
size 38 2.7x 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3
dispose 16 4.0x < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1
copy 55 3.9x 0.4 49.8 - 0.8 1.4 -
flatten w/append 48 4.0x 0.4 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.6
flatten w/acc 35 1.9x 0.6 1.7 0.7 0.5 0.6 -
BST
insert1 58 1.2x 31.9 - - - - - 11x
rotate left1 15 0.1x 37.7 - - - - - 0.5x
rotate right1 15 0.1x 17.2 - - - - - 0.8x
1 From (Qiu and Solar-Lezama 2017) 2 From (Leino and Milicevic 2012) 3 From (Qiu et al. 2013)
6 IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION
We implemented SSL-based synthesis as a tool, called SuSLik, in Scala, using Z3 (de Moura and Bjørner
2008) as the back-end SMT solver via the ScalaSMT library (Cassez and Sloane 2017).13 We evaluated
our implementation with the goal of answering the following research questions:
(1) Generality: Is SuSLik general enough to synthesize a range of nontrivial programs with pointers?
(2) Utility: How does the size of the inputs required by SuSLik compare to the size of the generated
programs? Does SuSLik require any additional hints apart from pre- and post-conditions? What
is the quality of the generated programs?
(3) Efficiency: Is it efficient? What is the effect of optimizations from Sec. 5 on synthesis times?
(4) Comparison with existing tools: How does SuSLik fare in comparison with existing tools for syn-
thesizing heap-manipulating programs, specifically, ImpSynt (Qiu and Solar-Lezama 2017)?
6.1 Benchmarks
In order to answer these questions, we assembled a suite of 22 programs listed in Tab. 1. The bench-
marks are grouped by the main data structure they manipulate: integer pointers, singly linked lists,
sorted singly linked lists, binary trees, and binary search trees.
To facilitate comparison with existing work, most of the programs are taken from the litera-
ture on synthesis and verification of heap-manipulating programs: the ImpSynt synthesis bench-
marks (Qiu and Solar-Lezama 2017), the Jennisys synthesis benchmarks (Leino and Milicevic 2012),
13The tool sources can be found at https://github.com/TyGuS/suslik.
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loc srtl_insert(loc x, int k)
requires srtl(x)
ensures srtl(ret) ∧
len(ret) = old(len(x)) + 1 ∧
min(ret) = (old(k) < old(min(x))
? old(k) : old(min(x))) ∧
max(ret) = (old(max(x)) < old(k)
? old(k) : old(max^(x)))
{
if (cond(1)) {
loc ?? := new;
return ??;
} else {
statement(1);
loc ?? := srtl_insert (??, ??);
statement(1);
return ??;
}
}
{
0 ≤ n ∧ 0 ≤ k ∧ k ≤ 7 ;
ret 7→ k ∗ srtl(x, n, lo, hi)
}
void srtl_insert(loc x, loc ret)
{
n1 = n + 1 ∧
lo1 = (k ≤ lo ? k : lo) ∧
hi1 = (hi ≤ k ? k : hi) ;
ret 7→ y ∗ srtl(y, n1, lo1, hi1)
}
Fig. 15. (le) The ImpSynt input for the sorted list insertion; (right) The SuSLik input for the same benchmark.
and the Dryad verification benchmarks (Qiu et al. 2013). We manually translated these benchmarks
into the input language of SuSLik, taking care to preserve their semantics. Dryad and ImpSynt use
the Dryad dialect of separation logic as their specification language, hence the translation in this
case was relatively straightforward. As an example, consider an ImpSynt specification and its SuS-
Lik equivalent in Fig. 15. The “??” are part of the ImpSynt spec language, denoting unknown holes
to be filled by the synthesizer. The main difference between the two pre-/post-condition pairs is that
the Dryad logic supports recursive functions such as len, min, and max; in SuSLik this information is
encoded in more traditional SL style: by passing additional ghost parameters to the inductive pred-
icate srtl. The extra precondition 0 ≤ n ∧ 0 ≤ k ∧ k ≤ 7 in SuSLik corresponds to implicit axioms
in ImpSynt (in particular, the condition on k is due to its encoding of list elements as unsigned 3-bit
integers—there is no such restriction in SuSLik). In addition to benchmarks from the literature, we
also added several new programs that show-case interesting features of SuSLik.
6.2 Results
Evaluation results are summarized in Tab. 1. All experiments were conducted on a commodity laptop
(2.7 GHz Intel Core i7 Lenovo Thinkpad with 16GB RAM).
6.2.1 Generality and Utility. Our experiment confirms that SuSLik is capable of synthesizing pro-
grams that manipulate a range of heap data structures, including nontrivial manipulations that re-
quire reasoning about both the shape and the content of the data structure, such as insertion into
a binary search tree. We manually inspected all generated solutions, as well as their accompanying
SSL derivations, and confirmed that they are indeed correct.14 Perhaps unsurprisingly, some of the
solutions were not entirely intuitive: as one example, the synthesized version of list copy, in a bizarre
yet valid move, swaps the tails of the original list and the copy at each recursive call!
Two of the programs in Tab. 1 make use of auxiliary functions: “insertion sort” calls “insert”, and
“tree flatten w/append” calls the “append” function on linked lists. The specifications of auxiliary
functions have to be supplied by the user (while their implementations can, of course, be synthesized
independently). Alternatively, tree flattening can be synthesized without using an auxiliary function,
if the user supplies an additional list argument that plays the role of an accumulator (see “tree flatten
14In the future, we plan to output SSL derivations as SL proofs, checkable by a third-party system such as VST (Appel 2011).
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w/acc”). As such, SuSLik shares the limitation of all existing synthesizers for recursive functions:
they require the initial synthesis goal to be inductive, and do not try to discover recursive auxiliary
functions (which is a hard problem, akin to lemma discovery in theorem proving).
For simple programs specification sizes are mostly comparable with the size of the synthesized
code, whereas more complex benchmarks is where declarative specifications really shine: for exam-
ple, for all Tree programs, the specification is at most half the size of the generated code. Three
notable outliers are “prepend”, “rotate left”, and “rotate right”, whose implementations are relatively
short, while the specification we inherited from ImpSynt describes the effects of the functions on
the minimum and maximum of the list/tree. Note that the specification sizes we report exclude the
definitions of inductive predicates, which are reusable, and are shared between the benchmarks.
6.2.2 Efficiency. SuSLik has proven to be efficient in synthesizing a variety of programs: all 22
benchmarks are synthesized within 40 seconds, and all but four of them take less than a second.
In order to assess the impact on performance of various optimizations described in Sec. 5, Tab. 1
also reports synthesis times with each optimization disabled: the column T-phase corresponds to
eliminating the distinction between phases; T-inv corresponds to ignoring rule invertibility; T-fail
corresponds to dropping all failure rules; T-com corresponds to disabling the symmetry reduction;
finally, T-all corresponds to a variant of SuSLikwith all the above optimizations disabled. The results
demonstrate the importance of optimizations for nontrivial programs: 8 out of 22 benchmarks time
out when all optimizations are disabled. The simpler benchmarks (e.g., swap) do not benefit from the
optimizations at all, since they do not exhibit a lot of backtracking. At the same time, all three BST
benchmarks time-out as a result of disabling even a single optimization.
6.2.3 Comparison with Existing Synthesis Tools. We compare SuSLikwith the most closely related
priorwork on ImpSynt (Qiu and Solar-Lezama 2017). Out of the 14 benchmarks from (Qiu and Solar-Lezama
2017) successfully synthesized by ImpSynt, we excluded 5 that are not structurally recursive (4 of
them use loops, and bst_del_root uses non-structural recursion); the other 9 were successfully syn-
thesized by SuSLik. The qualitative difference in terms of the required user input is immediately
obvious from the representative example in Fig. 15: in addition to the declarative specification, Imp-
Synt requires the user to provide an implementation sketch, which fixes the control structure of
the program, the positions of function calls, and the number of other statements. These additional
structural constraints are vital for reducing the size of the search space in ImpSynt. Instead, SuSLik
prunes the search space by leveraging the structure inherent in separation logic proofs, allowing for
more concise, purely declarative specifications.
Despite the additional hints from the user, ImpSynt is also less efficient: as shown in the column T-
IS of Tab. 1, on 6 out of 9 common benchmarks, ImpSynt takes at least an order of magnitude longer
than SuSLik, even though the ImpSynt experiments were conducted on a 10-core server with 96GB
of RAM.
On the other hand, ImpSynt is more general than SuSLik in that it can synthesize both recursive
and looping programs. We discuss this and other limitations of SuSLik in more detail in Sec. 7.
7 LIMITATIONS AND DISCUSSION
There are a number of known limitations of Synthetic Separation Logic and SuSLik design.
SSL does no support synthesis of programs with while-loops, as this would require discovering
loop invariants, which significantly increases the search space; instead, the initial goal is considered
as inductive and handled via Induction rule. As of now, SSL does not allow for mutually-recursive
inductive predicates. While not impossible in principle, this would require us to explore advanced
techniques for inductive proofs (Ta et al. 2016) and also generalize the use of tags; we plan to look into
this in the future. By limiting the number of unfoldings, viaOpen andClose rules, viaMaxUnfold, we
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circumvent a commonly known decidability problem of solving entailments in the presence of gen-
eral inductive predicates (Antonopoulos et al. 2014), but this also prevents some non-unreasonable
and perfectly specifiable in SSL programs from being synthesized, e.g., allocating a large constant-size
list.
Currently, SSL and SuSLik cannot automatically synthesize programs that are not structurally
recursive wrt. some inductive predicate, such as, for instance, merging sorted lists or Merge-Sort.
One approach to mitigate this limitation is to prove termination by showing that each recursive
call decreases the value of a custom termination metric; this technique is used in several automated
verifiers and synthesizers (Leino 2013; Polikarpova et al. 2016). A termination metric maps the tuple
of function’s arguments into an element of a set with a pre-defined well-founded order (usually a
tuple of natural numbers), and can be either provided by the user or inferred by the synthesizer.
Some of SSL limitations are inherent for Separation Logics in general: SLs are known to work well
with disjoint tree-like linked structures, and programs, whose recursion scheme matches the data
definition, but not so well with ramified data structures, e.g., graphs. To address those, one could
integrate a more powerful, ramified version of Frame rule (Hobor and Villard 2013) into SSL, but
this would likely require more hints from the user, thus, reducing the utility of the approach.
8 RELATED WORK
There are two main directions in the area of program synthesis: synthesis from informal descriptions
(such as examples, natural language, or hints) (Albarghouthi et al. 2013; Feng et al. 2017; Feser et al.
2015;Murali et al. 2018; Osera and Zdancewic 2015; Polozov and Gulwani 2015; Smith and Albarghouthi
2016; Yaghmazadeh et al. 2017) and synthesis from formal specifications. We will only discuss the
more relevant latter direction. The goal of this type of program synthesis is to obtain a provably
correct program.
In this area, there is a well-known trade-off between three dimensions: how complex the synthe-
sized programs are, how strong the correctness guarantees are, and how much input is required
form the user. On one end of the spectrum there are interactive synthesizers (Delaware et al. 2015;
Itzhaky et al. 2016), which can be very expressive and provide strong guarantees, but the user is
expected to guide the synthesis process (although, usually, with aid of dedicated proof tactics). On
the other end, there is fully automated synthesis for loop- and recursion-free programs over simple
domains, like arithmetic and bit-vectors (Alur et al. 2017; Gulwani et al. 2011). Our work lies in the
middle of this spectrum, where synthesis is automated but programs are more expressive.
In the presence of loops or recursion, verifying candidates becomes nontrivial. Synthesizers like
Sketch (Solar-Lezama 2013) and Rosette (Torlak and Bodík 2014) circumvent this problem by re-
sorting to bounded verification, which only provides restricted guarantees and has scalability issues
due to path explosion. In contrast, our work relies on unbounded deductive verification.
Among synthesis approaches that use unbounded verification, synthesizers likeLeon (Kneuss et al.
2013) and Synqid (Polikarpova et al. 2016) focus on pure functional (recursive) programs, which
are an easier target for unbounded verification. Proof-theoretic synthesis (Srivastava et al. 2010) is
capable of synthesizing imperative programs with loops and arrays, but no linked structures; they
pioneered the idea of synthesizing provably-correct programs by performing symbolic (SMT-based)
search over programs and their verification conditions simultaneously.
Finally, the two pieces of prior work that are most closely related to ours in terms of scope are Jen-
nisys (Leino and Milicevic 2012) and Natural Synthesis (Qiu and Solar-Lezama 2017), both of which
generate provably-correct heap-manipulating programs. Both of them are essentially instances of
proof-theoretic synthesis with a program logic for reasoning about the heap. To that end, Jennisys
uses the Dafny verifier (Leino 2013), which supports expressive yet undecidable specifications, and
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often requires hints from the user, so in practice the tool doesn’t scale to complex examples (for exam-
ple, none of their benchmarks performsmutation). Natural Synthesis uses Dryad (Madhusudan et al.
2012; Qiu et al. 2013), a decidable program logic for reasoning about heap-manipulating programs.
The downside of this approach is that whole-program symbolic search doesn’t scale to larger pro-
grams; to mitigate this, they require the user to provide sketches with substantial restrictions on the
structure of the program. Our approach does not require sketches (but on the other hand, we do not
support loops).
The recent tool FootPatch by van Tonder and Le Goues (2018) is very close in its methods and
goals to SuSLik. FootPatch builds on Infer (Calcagno and Distefano 2011), an open-source SL-based
static analyzer by Facebook, using it for automated program repair. It takes the intermediate asser-
tions, provided by Infer for programs with bugs, such as resource and memory leaks, and null deref-
erences, and constructs additive patches based on the observed discrepancy. In this, it acts similarly
to our AbduceCall rule. FootPatch does not synthesize patches that would involve recursion or
complex control flow.
Instead of whole-program symbolic search, like in proof-theoretic synthesis, our work follows the
tradition of deductive synthesis, i.e., backtracking search in the space of program derivation composed
of synthesis rules, which gradually transform a specification into a program. This tradition originates
from the seminal work by Manna and Waldinger (Manna and Waldinger 1980), and similar ideas has
been used in more recent synthesis work (Delaware et al. 2015; Kneuss et al. 2013; Polikarpova et al.
2016). In particular, the overall structure of our synthesis algorithm (backtracking and-or search) is
similar to Leon (Kneuss et al. 2013), but our rules focus on heap manipulation, whereas their rules
focus on synthesizing pure terms (so in fact Leon can be used as a component by our algorithm).
Recent work on Optitian (Miltner et al. 2018) is very different in scope—they synthesize bijective
string lenses from regular expression specifications and examples—but has interesting similarities in
the technique. Their pre- and post-condition are regexes, and their technique tries to “align” them
by e.g., unfolding the Kleene star; this is similar to how SuSLik tries to align the spatial pre- and
post-condition by unfolding predicates.
Deductive synthesis is closely related to proof search, and there has been recent resurgence in
applying proof-theoretic techniques, like focusing, to program synthesis (Frankle et al. 2016; Scherer
2017). But none of them do it for a complex logic that can reason about stateful programs.
Despite the vast space of available tools for symbolic verification based on Separation Logic: Small-
foot (Berdine et al. 2006),HTT (Nanevski et al. 2010),Bedrock (Chlipala 2011), SLAyer (Berdine et al.
2011), HIP/SLEEK (Chin et al. 2011), VeriFast (Jacobs et al. 2011), Cyclist (Rowe and Brotherston
2017), SLAD (Bouajjani et al. 2012), GRASShopper (Piskac et al. 2014b), Viper (Müller et al. 2016), to
name just a few, to the best of our knowledge none of them has been employed for deriving pro-
grams from specifications. It is certainly our hope that this work will bring new synergies between
the research done in verification, theorem proving, and program synthesis communities.
For instance, in our approach to establish termination of SSL-synthesized programs, we used tech-
niques close in spirit to the methods for proving total correctness in type/SL-based frameworks. E.g.,
SSL’s tags might be seen as a variant of resource capacities used in HIP/SLEEK (Le et al. 2014). Our
use of Definition 3.1 of sized validity is similar to the induction on the finiteness of the heap used
by Le and Hobor (2018) in their work on a logic for fractional shares. Tagged predicates we use are
reminiscent to the ⊲-modality in type theories for state and recursion (Appel et al. 2007).
9 CONCLUSION
In their seminal paper, Manna and Waldinger (1980) set forth an agenda for deductive synthesis of
functional programs: “theorem provers have been exhibiting a steady increase in their effectiveness, and
program synthesis is one of the most natural application of those systems”.
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In this work, we moved this endeavour to an uncharted territory of stateful computations. For
this, we employed a proof system which, instead of a pure type theory (Martin-Löf 1984), is based on
Separation Logic—aType Theory of State (Nanevski 2016). Taking this vision as a guiding principle, we
designed Synthetic Separation Logic—a modest extension of Separation Logic, tailored for program
synthesis, and implemented a proof search algorithm for it. In doing so, we took full advantage of
the power of local reasoning about state (O’Hearn et al. 2001), which resulted in a principled and fast
approach for synthesyzing provably correct heap-manipulating programs.
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A PROOFS OF FORMAL GUARANTEES FOR THE SYNTHESIZED PROGRAMS
Theorem A.1 (Theorem 3.3, Soundness of SSL). For any n, ∆′, if
(i) Σ ′; Γ ; {P}{ {Q}| c for a goal named f with formal parameters Γ , xi , and
(ii) Σ ′ is such that coh (∆′, Σ ′,n), and
(iii) for all p0(ei ),ϕ; P , such that {P} =
{
ϕ;p0(ei ) ∗ P
}
, taking F , f (xi ) :
{
ϕ;p1(ei ) ∗ ⌈P⌉
}
{⌈Q⌉ },
Σ ′,F ; Γ ; {P} c {Q} is n′-valid for all n′ < n wrt. ∆ , ∆′, f (ti xi ) { c },
then Σ ′; Γ ; {P} c {Q} is n-valid wrt. ∆.
Proof. Since c has been produced by an SSL derivation, it is (;)-associated to the right.
The proof is by the outer-level (well-founded) induction on the “footprint size” n. For each fixed
n, the proof is by an inner-level induction on the structure of derivation Σ ′; Γ ; {P}{ {Q}| c , with
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symbolic one-step execution (via  ). In that induction step we rely on the fact that the residual
“suffix” program is already valid, so we only need to show that applying a single rule preserves the
validity, while “appeding” a command c in front of an already synthesized program.
The inner proof routine is straightforward for or (sub-)goals, where the spatial part of P contains
no predicate instances.
All non-operational rules (Frame, Pick, SubstLeft, Emp, NullNotLVal, etc) either instantiate ex-
istentials in the post, weaken the pure obligations, or reduce the footprint, which is sound due to
locality of reading and writing (O’Hearn et al. 2001) and immutability of local variables; the sound-
ness of operational (Read,Write, etc) rules is due to the soundness of SL. Specifically:
• Case: Emp. The result follows immediately from Definition 3.1 of validity for any n.
• Case: SubstLeft. The result follows immediately from Definition 3.1 of validity for any n.
• Case:NullNotLVal. The non-nullness is encoded by the spatial precondition part (Reynolds 2002),
so the transformation is sound. The result follows immediately from Definition 3.1 of validity for
any heap size n.
• Case: StarPartial. The inequality of the two locations is encoded by the spatial part of the pre-
condition, so the transformation is sound. The result follows immediately from Definition 3.1 of
validity for any heap size n.
• Case: Inconsistency. The result follows immediately from Definition 3.1 of validity for any n, as
no physical pre-heap does satisfy ϕ, so it is safe to emit error.
• Case: Frame. The Frame rule in SSL is different from its counterpart in vanilla SL in that it does
not require a side condition saying that R must not contain program variables that are modified
by the program to be synthesized. Due to locality of read/write/malloc/free operations, they could
not depend on R, as already synthesized in the residual program, hence adding R to post will not
break validity, given that R is also added to the precondition.
• Case: Read. The synthesized read is safe, as the corresponding pointer is present in the precondi-
tion. Furthermore, it creates a program-level variable, which substantiates the environment vari-
able y, used for the synthesis in the subgoal, hence the new program is valid according to Defini-
tion 3.1.
• Case: Alloc. The subgoal has been synthesized in the larger footprint, afforded by allocation. The
soundness of the rule follows from the axiomatization of malloc (O’Hearn et al. 2001).
• Case: Free. Since the subgoal’s result is valid in a smaller pre-heap footprint and does not access
any variables from R, it is safe to deallocate it, hence the resulting program is valid.
• Case: AbduceCall. The validity is by the properties of the sequential composition c1; c2 and the
soundness of the frame rule of SL, applied as follows to the first sub-goal:
Σ; Γ ; {ϕ; F }{ {ϕ; F ′}| c1
Σ; Γ ; {ϕ; F ∗ P ∗ R}{ {ϕ; F ′ ∗ P ∗ R}| c1
• Case: UnifyHeaps. Since the unification only instantiates existentials, making the goal more spe-
cific, and unified variables will not appear in the program freely, the validity is by soundness of
the SL’s Auxiliary Variable Elimination rule (O’Hearn et al. 2001).
• Case: Pick. By the soundness of substitution and auxiliary variable elimination.
• Case: UnifyPure. By the soundness of substitution and auxiliary variable elimination.
• Case: SubstRight. By the soundness of substitution and auxiliary variable elimination.
• Case: Close. Validity follows from the fact that the sub-goal is valid in the presence of the elabo-
rated postcondition {ψ ∧ [σ ]ξk ∧ [σ ]χk ;Q ∗ R
′}. By the definition of Σ
I
, this heap satisfies the
corresponding predicate definition in the initial goal’s postcondition.
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In the case of predicate instances in the precondition, we take advantage of the tag machinery and
the assumptions (ii)–(iii) of the Theorem’s statement.
• Case: Induction. The assumption (ii) of the inductive hypothesis is satisfied via the initial assump-
tion (iii) and 1-tagging of the recursive hypothesis’s precondition, so it will only be applicable to
heaps of a size strictly smaller than n (follows from Open and Call).
• Case:Open. The validity is due to the fact that the emitted if-elsewill combine the sub-programs,
that are already valid wrt. their pres/posts. The access to those elaborated pres/posts, ensuring the
satisfiability of the elaborated precondition in each branch is due to the conditionals ξ j , which are
the same as the corresponding guard of the predicate instance being opened.
• Case: Call. This is the most interesting case. Validity of a function body’s substitution is via (ii).
Notice thatCall cannot be the first rule applied in the derivation, as then all predicate instances are
0-tagged, hence it should follow Open, which unfolds the instances, exposing smaller sub-heaps
captured by their clauses (due to well-foundedness of the predicates), which are now amenable for
using Call on them.
The remaining reasoning differs depending on whether the function f being called is a user-
provided auxiliary one, or a recursive call to the top-level goal. If a function being applied is a
user-provided specification (i.e., not a recursive self), then its validity is asserted by the second
clause of Definition 3.2, otherwise the call is recursive, and will only take place on a smaller heap,
satisfying the third option of Definition 3.2.

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